

Revolutionary activity in the Balkans from Lepanto to Kuchuk Kainardji

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Revolutionary activity in the Balkan Peninsula was not directed solely either against evils connected with Turkish domination or toward possible liberation from Ottoman rule. Among the several groups striving for improved conditions or greater privileges — primates, clergy, boyars, voevods, hajduks, clephts, armatoles, merchants and peasants — distinctly conflicting interests impugn the simplicity of the traditional accounts of the "fight for freedom of the oppressed Christians" provided by nationalist historians and foreign travelers. It is evident, however, that the common denominator of the numerous uprisings that occurred in the Peninsula from Lepanto to Kuchuk Kainardji was the desire to obviate the oppressive features of Ottoman supremacy in the Balkans by whatever means appeared most suitable at a given time.

The most effective form of attack on the status quo was the uprisings staged in times of armed conflict between a Christian power and the Ottoman Empire. More limited in scope and efficacy were the incessant guerilla operations against the Turks and Christian collaborationists conducted by the Montenegrins, the hajduks of Serbia, Bulgaria and the Rumanian provinces, the clephts and armatoles of Greece and the mountain tribes of Northern Albania and Herzegovina. Least successful were the frequent jacqueries in Moldavia, Wallachia, Bulgaria and Macedonia from the sixteenth century onward. Synchronization of these principal revolutionary manifestations throughout the Peninsula was never achieved, and the few limited cooperative efforts failed to reconcile the conflicting interests of the participants. But even in failure, the first such attempt during the Austro-Turkish war of 1593—1606 centering on the revolutionary figure of Michael the Brave of Wallachia constitutes the initial link in the long tradition of revolution in the Balkan Peninsula¹).

¹) P. P. Panaitescu, Mihai Viteazul (Bucharest, 1936), 1 ff.

Isolated revolutionary activities by various discontented elements are recorded even in earlier periods of Turkish domination. Their significance and effectiveness were however limited by lack of coordination and swift counteraction by a still powerful Porte. The most consequential challenge to Turkish authority in the early years of the Ottoman Empire was offered by the Moldavian voevod Peter Rareș who from 1528 to 1535 sought to exploit Suleiman's the Magnificent involvement in Persian and Hungarian affairs in order to gain autonomy. His involved intrigues with Ferdinand of Habsburg, the Polish monarchy, and (for the first time) Moscow came to naught with the arrival of a determined Turkish punitive expedition in 1538²⁾. The War of the Holy League permitted similar action in Albania, Greece and indirectly Moldavia. In 1571 Ibrahim Beyoli of Busciati exploited Turkish participation in the war to proclaim himself Pasha of Scutari³⁾ while a few years later the armatole leaders Theodora Bua Grivas, Drakos and Malamos, supported by Venice, rose in Akarnania, the Epiros and Arta⁴⁾. In Moldavia Ioan Voevod sought much but received little assistance from the Zaporogian Cossaks and Ivan IV in his fight to achieve autonomy from the Porte⁵⁾. All rebels were readily defeated by Ottoman forces because all revolts lacked the minimum requirements for success. Peter Rareș and Ioan Voevod had virtually no support from the aristocracy or clergy. The Albanian and Greek leaders were swashbuckling desperados and opportunists. Above all the absence of positive assistance from Austria, Russia, Poland and Venice — all unwilling to challenge Turkish power until late in the century — doomed them to failure. Equally unsuccessful were the sporadic peasant revolts against the Turkish masters in Bulgarian and Macedonian territory toward the middle of the century⁶⁾, the more

²⁾ J. Ursu, *Die auswärtige Politik des Peter Rareș, Fürst von Moldau (1527—1538)* (Vienna, 1908), 17 ff.

³⁾ F. Tajani, *Le Istorie Albanesi* (Salerno, 1886), 18 ff.

⁴⁾ G. F. Hertzberg, *Geschichte Griechenlands* (Gotha, 1876—1879), III, 42 ff.; W. Miller, „Greece under the Turks, 1571—1684“ *The English Historical Review*, XIX (1904), 648.

⁵⁾ N. Iorga, *Istoria Românilor* (Bucharest, 1937), V, 90 ff.; E. Stănescu, „Colăborarea militară dintre români și cazaci în ultimul sfert al veacului XVI-lea“, *Studii*, VII, No. 4 (1954), 212 ff.

⁶⁾ L. Lapé, „Nekolku podatoci za Mariovskoprilepskata buna od tvorata polovina na 16 vek“, *Stremez*, I, No. 5—6, 52 ff.; B. A. Cvetkova, „Prinos k'm izučavaneto na turskiia feodaliz'm v b'lgarskite zemi prez XV—XVI B“, *Izvestiia na Instituta za B'lgarska Istoriia*, VI (1956), 174 ff.

extensive jacquerie in Moldavia in 1563—1564⁷⁾), and the fruitless ravages of Turkish and Christian property by brigands whether clephts or hajduks⁸⁾). Nor did entreaties to revolt by clergy and missionaries, Orthodox or Catholic, fall on anything but deaf ears until the outbreak of the Austro-Turkish war in 1593 and the subsequent uprising of Michael the Brave. Only then, when Ottoman hegemony was challenged both from without and within, did revolution become a potential if not a potent instrument for attaining the divergent goals of all interested in changing the existing order.

The idea of exploiting the dissatisfaction of Balkan Christendom with the Infidel through encouragement of revolutionary action had been conceived by Western rulers long before the end of the sixteenth century. The liberation theme had been trumpeted by Maximilian I, Ferdinand I, Philip II and generations of popes, doges and other potentates but Rudolph II and Sigismund Bathory alone were prepared to supply the means for its practical implementation⁹⁾. It was the assurance of military and financial support that also brought into the open the hitherto cautiously-expressed discontent of the Balkan leaders and masses. Circumstances decreed that the commanding role in the Balkan Peninsula be assumed by Michael, the voevod of Wallachia. The foreign organizers, Rudolph and Bathory, would have preferred the weaker and more pliable voevod of Moldavia, Aaron Movilă¹⁰⁾. Michael's selection was agreed upon only after the Habsburg emperor and the Transylvanian prince realized that Poland was adamantly opposed to Movilă's participating in any anti-Turkish action organized by the allies and that the pro-Polish Moldavian boyars would fail to support the Habsburg-Transylvanian plans of substituting their suzerainty for the Ottoman or Polish. Thus it was only in 1594 that Rudolph and Bathory agreed to support the Wallachian ruler after securing acceptance by Michael's boyars of Transylvanian suzerainty¹¹⁾. Michael, who owed his position to the boyars who had elected him

⁷⁾ A. Grecu, „Răscoala Țăranilor în Moldova în Anii 1563—1564”, Studii, VI, No. 2 (1953), 201 ff.

⁸⁾ See particularly D. J. Popović, *O Hajducima* (Belgrade, 1930—31), I, 92 ff.

⁹⁾ Panaitescu, *Mihai Viteazul*, 36 ff.; *Documente privitoare la Istoria Românilor*; E. de Hurmuzaki and N. Iorga, eds. (Bucharest, 1900), XI, 238 ff.

¹⁰⁾ *Documente privitoare la Istoria Românilor*; E. de Hurmuzaki, ed. (Bucharest, 1880), III, part 1, 174 ff., 193 ff.

¹¹⁾ *Ibid*, 196 ff.

only the year before, acquiesced in the *fait accompli* and assumed command of the revolution in Wallachia.

Michael's objectives, as selfish as those of the boyars he represented, were limited at the beginning of the uprising to easing the financial burdens imposed upon Wallachia by Turkish vassalage and maintaining political power in the hands of the boyar oligarchy. Himself, one of the leading boyars, in no way thought of himself as the leader of a revolutionary crusade throughout the Peninsula nor as a liberator of the oppressed peasantry. He readily accepted the substitution of Transylvanian for Ottoman suzerainty as the terms offered by Bathory and endorsed by Rudolph surpassed the Porte's¹²). His success as a revolutionary leader can be ascribed more to his military prowess than to the altruism of his motivations. For it was indeed his military triumphs over the hitherto nearly invincible Turks that fused the isolated and generally disorganized uprising in other parts of the Peninsula into a common if not coordinated movement in 1595. But these very military victories eventually spelled disaster for himself and the revolution he led when his aims and the Wallachian boyars became incompatible with those of the Austrians and Transylvanians on whom he ultimately depended for success.

When Michael and his boyars formally joined the war against the Turks several other Balkan leaders had already committed themselves to revolutionary action in support of the Habsburg cause and a full fledged revolt had started among the Serbian population in the Banat¹³). The Ragusian merchants Paolo Giorgio and John Marini Polli, the principal agents of the Habsburgs, had secured the consent of Aaron of Moldavia as early as August 1594 to join the Holy League and undertake military action at the proper time¹⁴). They had also tried, as yet unsuccessfully, to organize a revolt among the Croatian inhabitants of Dalmatia¹⁵). In the Peninsula itself, however, the potential revolutionary forces were still dormant until Michael's victories against Sinan Pasha in 1595. Then only did *hajduks*, churchmen and merchants gradually and cautiously begin

¹²) Ibid, 209—213, 218—219.

¹³) I. C. Dostian, *Borba serbskovo naroda protiv turetskovo iga* (Moscow, 1958), 63 ff.

¹⁴) Documente; Hurmuzaki, ed., III, part 1, 200 ff.; Documente; Hurmuzaki and Iorga, eds., XI, 426 ff.; Panaitescu, *Mihai Viteazul*, 39 ff.

¹⁵) Panaitescu, *Mihai Viteazul*, 42 ff.

to sound out Michael the Brave and his patron Rudolph for possible assistance¹⁶). Their interest and participation during the following years were also in direct ratio to the extent of Michael's victories and promises of Habsburg support.

Developments proved this basis precarious, both because of Michael's narrow concept of revolution and his dependence on foreign aid. The voevod's victories won him first the support of itinerant hajduks, led by Deli Marko and Baba Novak, men who had agreed as early as 1594 to aid the Habsburgs¹⁷). Rudolph's orders for cooperation with Michael resulted in their sacking Sofia and Monastir in Bulgarian territory in 1595 before they actually joined Michael as mercenaries¹⁸). The following year revolutionary preparations and actions proceeded on a wider and better organized basis. Deli Marko's raiding of Pleven encouraged several Bulgarian churchmen to seek direct assistance from Rudolph. A delegation headed by Paul Gjorgjić and Theodor Ballina reached the emperor in Prague in 1596 and received promises of military aid in March 1597¹⁹). An independent mission entrusted to the churchman Dionisie Rally was despatched to Wallachia²⁰). By 1598 the several leaders joined Michael's forces as he crossed the Danube thereby proclaiming an extension of his revolt into Bulgarian territory. Simultaneously, Ballina and Rally sparked a diversionary movement among the merchants in Trnovo²¹). All revolutionary actions in Bulgaria failed as they rested on the unrealistic premise that Michael would continue victorious and that sustained support would be forthcoming from him, Rudolph, and the peasant masses. To Michael the Bulgarian actions were entirely subsidiary to the attainment of his own goal: to exploit the

¹⁶) Ibid, 44 f.

¹⁷) F. Slipičević, *Istorija Naroda Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije* (Sarajevo, 1954), 296 ff.; Dostian, *Borba*, 65 ff.

¹⁸) A. Hajek, *Bulgarien unter der Türkenherrschaft* (Berlin, 1925), 32 ff.; *Akademiā Nauk SSSR, Istorija Bolgarii* (Moscow, 1954), I, 193 ff.

¹⁹) Hajek, *Bulgarien*, 33 ff.

²⁰) N. Iorga, "Un conseiller byzantin de Michel-le Brave: le Métropolitaine Denis Rhalis Paléologue", *Académie Roumaine. Bulletin de la Section Historique*, V—VIII (1920), 92 ff.; M. N. Tihomirov, "Istoricheskie sviazi russkovo naroda s iuzhnymi slavianimi s drevneishich vremien do poloviny XVII v.", *Slavianskii Sbornik* (1947), 195 ff.; V. Velčev, "B'lgari i Russi v svetlinata na dviženieto za slaviānsko edinstvo", *Istoričeski Pregled*, V (1948—1949), 82 ff.

²¹) Iorga, *Un conseiller*, 92 ff.; Hajek, *Bulgarien*, 35 ff.; *Akademia Nauk, Istorija*, 197 ff.

power-vacuum created by the retirement of Sigismund Bathory and the chaos reigning in Moldavia after the death of Aaron. In 1598 he abandoned the Bulgarians and devoted his attention to extending his sphere of influence and that of his boyars into Moldavia and Transylvania²²). Rudolph too became indifferent to the Bulgarian uprisings as he himself now assigned priority to Transylvanian affairs. Finally, the Bulgarian peasantry appeared to have no interest in joining Michael or their leaders partly because of apathy, partly because of the composition of Michael's forces. For by 1598 the Wallachian was exclusively reliant on mercenaries, hajduks and other desperados, whose meager wages were supplemented by robbing and looting the population in the areas they invaded. The Wallachian peasants who had joined Michael in 1594 lost whatever initial enthusiasm they had when their ruler and the boyars refused to share the spoils of victory with them. Instead of reduction in taxation there were increases, instead of abatement of feudal obligations there was the formal binding of the peasant to the land on Michael's orders and an extension of the physical area of serfdom through mass transfer of hitherto free land to boyar estates. Michael and his boyars were reaping the fruits of victory for themselves. Several jacqueries were directed against Michael and the boyars in Wallachia as early as 1596. Some peasants even sought the assistance of the Turks against their native "liberators", others fled across the Danube into Bulgarian territory²³).

It is unknown whether the Bulgarian peasants were affected by Wallachian immigration into their lands but it is certain that they reacted violently against Michael's mercenaries. The Turks easily quelled the unsupported Trnovo uprising and with it the ill-organized Bulgarian revolts by the end of 1598²⁴).

Similar fates were met by the other revolutionary movements. In Herzegovina a small group of potential rebels headed by Bishop

²²) Panaitescu, Mihai Viteazul, 146 ff.

²³) P. P. Panaitescu, "Dreptul de strămutare al țăranilor în Țările Române", Academia Republicii Populare Române. Institutul de Istorie: Studii și Materiale de Istorie Medie, I (1956), 85 ff.; Panaitescu, Mihai Viteazul, 87 ff.; Documente privind istoria României; Academia Republicii Populare Române, ed. (Bucharest, 1953), VI (B. Țara Românească), 21 ff.

²⁴) Akademia Nauk, Istoriia, 197 ff.; N. I. Milev, Katolichkata Propaganda v Bulgaria prez XVII vek (Sofia, 1914), 18 ff.; V. N. Zlatarski, "B'lgarski v'zstaniia i opiti za v'zstaniia do sredata na XIX vek'", B'lgariia 1000 Godini (927—1927) (Sofia, 1930), 710 ff.

Vissarion of Trebinje and several knezes had sought Rudolph's aid in 1596²⁵). Their aim was less to join Michael directly than to coordinate efforts with the voevod of Nikšić, Grdan, who was independently attempting to gain independence for his mountainous lands when Michael registered his first victories²⁶). In Serbia proper the Patriarch of Ipek was in the process of organizing a sustaining revolt with knezes joining in a general conspiracy in the western part of the Peninsula²⁷). In Macedonia Bishop Athanasie and the hajduks were also active²⁸). Even Montenegro was planning to rise under propitious conditions²⁹). But these grandiose schemes were discouraged by Rudolph's noncommittal attitude. The Habsburg, profoundly skeptical of the possibilities of success in tightly controlled and inaccessible areas, preferred to support Michael and potential revolutionaries in territories contiguous to Wallachia rather than to spread his meager resources too thin. Hence, the few isolated local movements that occurred in Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro amounted to little more than minor disturbances with which the Turks had been accustomed to dealing since the fifteenth century. Nevertheless, the concept of partially integrated revolutionary action on an inter-Balkan scale had been formulated, however imperfectly, by the end of the sixteenth century. Subsequent events, connected largely with the eventual outcome of Michael's revolt and of the Austro-Turkish war, pointed up the misconceptions of the early planners of revolution and set the pattern for more realistic arrangements between those who would revolt and those who would sponsor and benefit from such action.

The end of Michael's revolutionary activity is well known³⁰). In

²⁵) L. Hadrovics, *Le peuple serbe et son église sous la domination turque* (Paris, 1947), 134 ff.; J. Fiedler, "Versuche der türkisch-südslawischen Völker zur Vereinigung mit Österreich unter Kaiser Rudolph II., 1594—1606", *Slavische Bibliothek*, II (1885), 289.

²⁶) Slipičević, *Istorija*, 296; S. Mijušković, "Pleme Nikšići u Morejskom ratu (1684—1699)", *Istoriski Zapisi*, VII (1954), 1 ff.; M. Prelog, *Povijest Bosne u Doba Osmanlijske Vlade* (Sarajevo, 19), I, 80 ff.

²⁷) Dostian, *Borba*, 68; Hadrovics, *Le peuple*, 134.

²⁸) L. Lapé, "Prilog kon istorijata na borbite na našiot narod v 16 i početokat na 17 vek protiv turskata viast", *Nov Den*, IV (1948), 26 ff., 37 ff.

²⁹) See summary statements in J. Tadić, ed., *Ten Years of Yugoslav Historiography, 1945—1955* (Belgrade, 1955), 337 ff.

³⁰) Panaitescu, *Mihai Viteazul*, 160 ff.

1598 he invaded Moldavia and assumed a tenuous control over that province. The Polish-oriented Moldavian boyars fled into Polish territory and their lands were taken over by a pro-Michael faction and some of the Wallachian boyars. In the same year, the voevod invaded Transylvania, allegedly in behalf of Rudolph to save the province from falling again into the hands of Sigismund Bathory who was supported by the Poles and Turks. Here his position was even more precarious than in Moldavia as he met the concerted opposition of the Transylvanian aristocracy, whether pro or anti-Habsburg, united against extension of rights and privileges to the Wallachian boyars. He was also opposed by Rudolph himself when it became apparent to the monarch and his advisers that Michael was double-dealing with a view to establishing permanent control over the province with Turkish, Polish and even Russian assistance. In 1601 Michael was assassinated with Rudolph's tacit consent.

The revolt against the Turks in the Rumanian provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia and in other parts of the Balkans did not end with Michael's death; it was carried on in a desultory fashion until 1606 when the Treaty of Zsitvatorok theoretically restored the status quo ante. But the bases for resumption of anti-Turkish activities had been strengthened in defeat.

The primary lesson learned by revolutionary elements in the Peninsula was that more methodical preparation and diversification of activities and sources of potential support was necessary. The callous betrayal of the once revered Michael the Brave did not discourage them from further collaboration with his foreign sponsors. In fact for several years following the Treaty of Zsitvatorok Radu Șerban, Michael's immediate successor in Wallachia, and his boyars openly supported the Habsburgs in open defiance of Ottoman and Polish protests³¹). Șerban was removed from power by the Turks but his successors continued the policy of pro-Austrian alignment. Throughout the seventeenth century several boyar groupings and Wallachian princes engaged in sub-rosa negotiations with the Habsburgs for financial and military support at the proper time³²). Outside Wallachia Austrian assistance was sought even more actively, especially by Catholic clergy and laymen in Bulgarian and

³¹) Best account in V. Motogna, "Războaiele lui Radu Șerban, 1602—1611", *Academia Română. Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice. Seria III. VI* (1927), 241 ff.

³²) *Documente*; Hurmuzaki, ed., IV, part 2, 349 ff., V, part 1, 34 ff.

Bosnian territory³³). In turn, Habsburg encouragement of all factions kept this avenue of possible anti-Turkish action open to all interested in undermining Ottoman control.

The foremost exponents of a pro-Austrian policy prior to the war of the Holy League (1683—1699) were the Bulgarian Franciscan Peter Parchevich and certain Wallachian boyars and voevods³⁴). Between 1647 and 1656 Parchevich concentrated on securing funds and promises of assistance for liberation of Balkan Christendom from the Infidel from Catholic Europe in general and the Habsburgs in particular. His repeated and prolonged visits to the courts of Wladislav of Poland, Ferdinand III of Austria, the papacy, Venice and even Philip IV of Spain however proved futile. The vague promises of assistance he elicited were never translated into positive action by cautious leaders anxious to avoid direct intervention in Balkan affairs. Nevertheless, Parchevich as well as the Bosnian Franciscans, several Wallachian rulers and boyars and Grdan's successors now headed by Tranowsky remained convinced that salvation rested with Austria³⁵). Indeed, intense Franciscan activity in the first part of the seventeenth century had been supported and financed by the Habsburgs who had also secretly encouraged Tranowsky's radical proposals for liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria. Rumanian emissaries had also been well received in Vienna. The meagerness of the results of this approach to the problem of weakening Turkish controls in the Peninsula led other discontented groups, however, to favor independent action or intensified collaboration with Venice, Russia and Poland.

The pro-Venetian elements showed their greatest strength during the Candian War. Montenegrin chieftains concluded a formal treaty with Venice by which the Republic granted them protection and

³³) M. P. Īonov, "Po v'prosa za politikata na Avstriia k'm Turciia i političeskite dviženiiia v B'lgariia ot kraia na XVI do načaloto na XVIII v.", *Istoričeski Pregled*, XII (1956), 34 ff.; F. Mareš, "Aufstandsversuche der christlichen Völker in der Türkei in den Jahren 1625—1646", *Mittheilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, III (1882), 249 ff.; B. Rupčić, *Entstehung der Franziskanerpfarreien in Bosnien und der Herzegowina und ihre Entwicklung bis zum Jahre 1878* (Breslau, 1937), 91 ff.

³⁴) J. Pejacsevich, "Peter Freiherr von Parchevich, Erzbischof von Martianopol", *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte*, LIX (1880), 343 ff.; Mareš, *Aufstandsversuche*, 248 ff.; I. Dujčev, "Italienische Kultureinflüsse in Bulgarien während des 17. Jahrhunderts", *Südost-Forschungen*, V (1940), 819 ff.

³⁵) Mareš, *Aufstandsversuche*, 248—252.

promised autonomy in the event of victory over the Turks³⁶). Thereafter their forces pursued diversionary guerilla tactics immobilizing Ottoman forces that might have been dispatched against the Signoria. In Greek territory the Mainates lent strong support to Morosini on land and sea³⁷). Christian Albanians joined the pro-Venetian forces in the Maina and fought alongside the Montenegrins in Brda and other mountainous regions³⁸); a few of their Moslem counterparts defected from Turkish military formations. But these efforts were as vain as those of Parhevich and the pro-Austrian elements and even more costly since Venice had to acknowledge defeat with the loss of Candia and Crete in 1669. They reveal, however, a more advanced concept of revolutionary collaboration in that the formal treaty between revolutionary and sponsor previously used only by Michael the Brave and Aaron Movilă is now adopted by Montenegro. The method of securing formal agreements with would be supporters is also used more extensively during these years by Balkan leaders, chiefly Wallachians and Moldavians, seeking Russian and Polish support for their liberation schemes.

The enrollment of Russia as a partner against the Turks was first envisaged by Michael the Brave. He had appealed to tsars Feodor and Boris Godunov for military aid invoking the bond of a common religion and a common enmity toward Turks and Poles³⁹). The Bulgarian clergyman Nectarie and Bishop Athanasie of Macedonia concurrently appealed to Moscow for help on grounds of the community of religious interests⁴⁰). But neither Feodor, nor Boris, nor their successors during the Times of Trouble could spare encouragement to Balkan suppliants. Only after the establishment of the Romanov dynasty did the Russian autocrat respond to the entreaties of would-be revolutionaries. In the carefully drawn treaty of 1656 with Gheorghe Ștefan of Moldavia Alexis agreed to accept Ștefan's offer of submission and vassalage in return for military assistance against the

³⁶) G. Stanojević, "Odnosi Venecije sa Hercegovačkim, Brdskim i Crnogorskim plemenima od opsade Kotora 1657 godine do početka Morejskoga rata", *Istoriski Časopis*, IX (1959), 205 ff. Terms in G. Stanojević, "Crna Gora u doba Kandiskog rata (1645—1669)", *Istoriski Glasnik* (1953), 25—28.

³⁷) Miller, *Greece*, 652 ff.; Hertzberg, *Geschichte*, III, 58 ff.

³⁸) Tajani, *Istorie*, 26; Stanojević, *Odnosi*, 205 ff.

³⁹) Panaitescu, *Mihai Viteazul*, 204 ff.

⁴⁰) Velčev, *B'lgari i Russi*, 82 ff.; Lapé, *Prilog*, 37 ff.

Turk at the right moment⁴¹). Although it was never implemented because of Ștefan's removal from power by the Porte during the Russo-Polish war when Alexis could not intervene in his behalf, the mere existence of the treaty encouraged Moldavian boyars to turn to Moscow for assistance in later years. By the time the major Austro-Turkish conflict erupted in 1683 Russia was regarded as a potential saviour by a substantial segment of the Rumanian aristocracy. But the Rumanian overtures to Russia since the middle of the seventeenth century were connected with new and more complex anti-Turkish manifestations which were developing only in the Rumanian provinces.

The principal source of discontent was the divide and conquer policy pursued by the Porte after Sistvatorok. Gradually Constantinople shifted to direct appointment of voevods with only token approval by the theoretically sovereign electors, the boyars. The proteges of the Porte, normally from the Phanar, brought with them retinues of Greeks to the dismay of the native ruling class. The growing influence of the foreigners provoked a series of anti-Greek uprisings⁴²). Occasionally during the seventeenth century one of the rare native voevods would join with his boyars to plot the substitution of another suzerainty for the Turkish yoke. Thus under Matei Basarab advances were made to the Habsburg Emperor, to the Transylvanian prince George Rakoczy and even to Wladislav of Poland pledging submission to these potential new overlords⁴³). Refusals did not deter them from resuming negotiations whenever conditions permitted. Thus when Grigore Ghica of Wallachia and the pro-Turkish boyars dutifully joined the sultan in pursuing the war against the Habsburgs in 1664 a major segment of the native aristocracy was seeking Austrian support for an internal coup d'état⁴⁴). In Moldavia the problem was further complicated by growing Polish

⁴¹) G. D. Ionescu, "Tratatul încheiat de Gheorghe Ștefan cu Rușii în 1656", *Revista Istorică Română*, III (1933), 235 ff.; P. Constantinescu-Iași, *Relațiile culturale romîno-ruse din trecut* (Bucharest, 1954), 124 ff.

⁴²) A. D. Xenopol, *Istoria Românilor din Dacia Traiană* (Bucharest, 1929), VII, 12 ff.; I. Rosetti, "Iordache Ruset", *Revista Istorică Română*, VI (1937), 300 ff.

⁴³) Xenopol, *Istoria Românilor*, VII, 28 ff.

⁴⁴) O. Brunner, "Oesterreich und die Walachei während des Türkenkrieges von 1683—1699", *Mitteilungen des österreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung*, XLIV (1930), 275 ff.; C. Giurescu and N. Dobrescu, eds., *Documente și regeste privitoare la Constantin Brâncoveanu* (Bucharest, 1907), 1 ff.

influence in the isolated province with a subsequent tripartite division among the pro-Polish aristocracy, the Greek element, and the anti-Polish and anti-Greek minority favoring Russia. It was the latter group which joined Bogdan Khmel'nitsky in supporting Vasile Lupu's attempts to end Polish influence and later, in 1656, backed Gheorghe Ștefan for the same purpose⁴⁵). These involved conspiracies kept the Rumanian provinces during most of the seventeenth century in a state of almost continuous civil war among divergent boyar factions. Constantinople officially overlooked but furtively fomented dissension with remarkable success until 1683.

The disabling internal chaos however created conditions permitting the rise of a new revolutionary force: the Rumanian hajduk. Throughout the century an increasing number of localized peasant revolts — all easily repressed by the boyars — resulted in the flight of numbers of rebels to escape punishment. In the Carpathian mountains and elsewhere fugitive peasants became the nuclei of the hajduk guerilla bands. From time to time they accepted discontented mercenaries (often unpaid by the factions which had retained them) as their leaders, thus forming an auxiliary revolutionary force that frequently supported peasant conspiracies against boyars⁴⁶). Together with the clephts and armatoles whose raids forced the Turks to strengthen their garrisons in Greek areas during and after the Candian War and the insuppressible mountaineers of Montenegro, Herzegovina and Northern Albania, the Rumanian hajduks constituted a serious internal threat to the Ottoman Empire, with its growing list of declared and potential enemies. The usefulness of these groups and most of the other conspirators and revolutionaries was proven during the period of armed conflict between the Porte and the allied powers of Austria, Russia, Poland and Venice that commenced in 1683.

The War of the Holy League offered a new opportunity to opponents of the Ottoman system to coordinate their activities both within and without the Peninsula. But the union of the Balkan malcontents was like that of the League itself one of convenience. In contrast to the only other major international campaign against

⁴⁵) Ionescu, *Tratatul*, 238 ff.; I. Nistor, "Contribuții la relațiunile dintre Moldova și Ucraina în veacul al XVII-lea", *Academia Română. Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice. Seria III., XIII (1932—1933)*, 204 ff.

⁴⁶) Constantinescu-Iași, *Relațiile*, 24 ff.; *Documente*; *Academia Republicii Populare Române*, ed., II (B), 14 ff., 66 ff., II (A), 197 ff., 228 ff.

the Turk that had won the adherence of the Balkan peoples a century earlier, the War of the Holy League failed to produce another Michael the Brave or even a Rudolph of Habsburg. For this the factionalism of the European allies and of the Rumanian boyars was primarily to blame. After Mohammed Sokolli's failure at Vienna the divergent interests of Poland, Austria, Venice and Russia became apparent not only to the allies themselves but also to the Rumanians and even to certain Serbian and Greek opponents of the Turkish order. Officially Moldavia and Wallachia remained loyal to the Porte. Șerban Cantacuzino, the Wallachian prince, dutifully joined the Ottoman forces on their way to Vienna and even after the catastrophe of 1683 refused to claim himself for the Habsburgs. In this he was supported by a substantial number of boyars who feared that a definite alignment with Austria would invite the ire of the Porte and alienate their alternate patron, Russia. Cantacuzino's tortuous double dealings, alternating between cautious promises of possible support to the Austrians and offers to conduct espionage in their behalf on Turkish troop movements (while simultaneously proffering like assurances of loyalty to the Porte) were made even more complex by his attempting to secure guarantees of Russian protection in the event that either Austria or Constantinople tried to remove him from power⁴⁷). His successor, Brâncoveanu, pursued an equally devious course although after 1690 he tended to turn more and more toward Russia⁴⁸). The Moldavian counterparts, Constantin Cantemir, Constantin Duca and Antioh Cantemir at first favored collaboration with Poland but fear of the Turks and of the growing strength of their trans-Dniestrian neighbor gradually led them to follow a course similar to Brâncoveanu's⁴⁹). Elsewhere in the Peninsula revolutionary action occurred on a purely local basis. The Venetians received the cautious support of the Mainate and Morean

⁴⁷) Giurescu and Dobrescu, *Documente*, 1 ff.; I. Radonić, "Situatiunea internațională a principatului Țerii-Românești în vremea lui Șerban Cantacuzino (1678—1688)", *Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice. Seria II.*, XXXVI (1914), 955 ff.; J. Fiedler, „Antwort Rußlands auf den Hilferuf der griechischen Südslaven, 1689“, *Slavische Bibliothek*, II (1858), 282 ff.; L. E. Semeonova, "Din istoria relațiilor romîno-ruse de la sfîrșitul secolului XVII—începutul secolului XVIII", *Analele Romîno-Sovietice. Seria Istorie* (1959), 113 ff.

⁴⁸) Giurescu and Dobrescu, *Documente*, V ff.; Semeonova, *Din istoria*, 117 ff.

⁴⁹) Xenopol, *Istoria Românilor*, VII, 269 ff.; Constantinescu-Iași, *Relațiile*, 160 ff.

primates but could not gain the cooperation of *clephts* and *armatoles* who fought independently against Turk, Venetian and Greek alike. The Venetians did, however, muster some support from Athens and Thessaly but little from Chios or other Greek areas⁵⁰). Nor were the representatives of the Signoria more successful elsewhere in the Balkans. Their virtual rejection of Arsenje of Ipek's proposal for common action with the Serbs turned the Patriarch toward an Austria willing to offer better terms⁵¹). For Arsenje had asked for iron-clad guarantees of religious toleration for the Orthodox Church and sanctuary for revolutionaries (in the event of failure) or autonomy (in the event of victory), all stipulations unacceptable to the Republic. Leopold, on the contrary, readily acceded to the wishes of the Patriarch and with Arsenje's blessing issued his celebrated appeal to revolution to all Balkan Slavs against the common foe⁵²). As a result of this compromise the Serbs took up arms against the Turks alongside Catholic Austria. But in the end their revolt failed as Patriarch and Emperor each developed misgivings about the wisdom of their agreement. Even before casting his lot with the Habsburg, Arsenje had tried to secure a commitment from Moscow and would have preferred support from remote but Orthodox Russia to Austrian. The Austrians were aware of these machinations and tried to undermine Arsenje's influence by installing their creature Brankovich as a secular leader. The purpose of this stratagem became evident after the Patriarch's championship of their liberation proclamation failed to arouse Bosnia and Northern Albania. Still they could not dispense with Arsenje's services as the ambitions of Brankovich himself had to be contained. The ineffectiveness of the military measures, the lukewarm support received from the peasantry and external political considerations resulted in complete with-

⁵⁰) W. Miller, "The Venetian Revival in Greece, 1684—1718", *The English Historical Review*, XXXV (1920), 343 ff.; A. A. Bernardy, *Venezia e il Turco* (Florence, 1902) 84 ff.

⁵¹) Hadrovics, *Le peuple*, 136 ff.; Dostian, *Borba*, 79 ff.; J. N. Tomić, "Patrijarh Arsenije III Crnojević prema Mlečićima i česaru 1685—1659", *Glas Srpske Kraljevske Akademije*, LXX (1906), 119 ff.; C. Gianelli, "Lettere del Patriarca di Peć Arsenio III e del Vescovo Savatije all'Arcivescovo di Antivari Andrea Zmajević", *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, XXI (1955), 68 ff.

⁵²) Hadrovics, *Le peuple*, 137 ff.; R. M. Grujić, "Prilozi za istoriju Srba u Austro-Ugarskoj", *Srpska Kraljevska Akademia. Spomenik. Series II.*, XLIII (1913), 18—19; R. M. Grujić, "Tri pisma česara Leopolda I carigradskim patrijarsima", *Srpska Kraljevska Akademia. Spomenik. Series II.*, XLIII (1913), 13 ff.

drawal of Austria in 1690. Arsenje and his followers migrated into Habsburg territory as the abandoned revolt collapsed⁵³). In Bulgaria even worse disasters awaited Austrian supporters. There the Catholic inhabitants of the mining area of Čiprovec rose in 1687 at the exhortations of Leopold. But Austrian military aid did not arrive and the rebels were mercilessly crushed by Turks and their ally, the Transylvanian Tökölly⁵⁴).

As the immediate consequence of the ill-fated uprisings the Serbian and Bulgarian sympathizers suspended all attempts at collaboration with the Habsburgs and, wherever in the Peninsula circumstances permitted, pro-Russian orientation grew increasingly strong.

The pro-Russian attitude was first translated into positive action in 1711 when Dimitrie Cantemir, the ruler of Moldavia, concluded a formal agreement with Peter the Great pledging supportive military action in the event of a Russo-Turkish conflict⁵⁵). This treaty was the most specific yet concluded between Balkan revolutionaries and a foreign power. It secured extensive privileges for the ruler, limitation on the powers of the boyars, hereditary rule, tax reforms, and included a variety of other clauses designed to secure virtual independence for Moldavia under the ultimate suzerainty of the Russian Tsar. Peter's function, as well as that of his successors, would be merely to accord protection against foreign enemies in the event of a successful joint venture and asylum to Cantemir and his supporters in the event of failure. Similar negotiations were entered into by the Wallachian Brâncoveanu but no formal agreement was concluded. However, a verbal promise of mutual assistance was wrested by Peter from the cautious ruler of Wallachia⁵⁶). The revo-

⁵³) Hadrovics, *Le peuple*, 139 ff.; Prelog, *Povijest*, I, 105 ff.; V. Klaić, *Geschichte Bosniens* (Leipzig, 1885), 445 ff.; J. Radonić, *Grof Djordje Branković* (Belgrade, 1911), 5 ff.; H. Gerba, „Die Kaiserlichen in Albanien 1689“, *Mittheilungen des K. K. Kriegsarchivs*, Neue Folge, II (1888), 117 ff.

⁵⁴) A. Ivić, „Aussiedlungen der Bulgaren in Ungarn“, *Archiv für Slavische Philologie*, XXXI (1910), 414 ff.; Ćonov, *Po v'prosa*, 45 ff.; Milev, *Katolishkata*, 18 ff.; *Acta Bulgariae Ecclesiastica ab A. 1565 usque A. 1799*; E. Fermendžin, ed. (Zagreb, 1887), 304 ff.

⁵⁵) An excellent critical discussion may be found in P. P. Panaitescu, *Dimitrie Cantemir* (Bucharest, 1958), 104 ff.

⁵⁶) Giurescu and Dobrescu, *Documente*, XLVI ff., 196 ff., 294 ff.; Seemeonova, *Din istoria*, 129 ff.; N. Iorga, „Carol al XII-lea, Petru cel Mare si țerile noastre (1709—1714)“, *Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice. Seria II.*, XXXIII (1910—1911), 71 ff.

lution against the Turks broke out in Moldavia as soon as Peter crossed the Dniestr in 1711. Cantemir and the pro-Russian boyars lent military support to the Tsar and acknowledged his suzerainty. Brâncoveanu was less cooperative, circumscribed in his actions by pessimism about Russian victory and the boyars' reluctance to commit themselves with the outcome in doubt. There was little participation by the peasantry and hajduks except in isolated areas in Moldavia where some deluded serfs regarded Peter as a liberator from boyar oppression⁵⁷). It is generally known that the revolt failed because of Peter's inability to register decisive military successes against the Turkish armies early in the campaign. An equally abortive insurrection occurred in Montenegro where the Vladika and chieftains rose in response to Peter's proclamation of a „general uprising of the Orthodox Balkan Christendom“ and the all inclusive promises of assistance and protection made by the Tsar's agent Miloradovich⁵⁸). This revolt, which began after the Tsar's forces had already capitulated at Stănilești in 1711 received no support and resulted in nothing but rash reprisals from the Porte.

The Russian fiasco brought disarray to the ranks of Peter's supporters and caused a shift in tactics and orientation. Cantemir's flight to Russia, Brâncoveanu's execution, and the destruction of the boyars allied with them either through butchery or banishment restored power to the pro-Turkish factions in Moldavia and Wallachia now headed by the Greek Phanariote appointees from Constantinople and their Greek supporters. The native boyars' anti-Turkish manifestations were limited in the main to conspiracies against the new Greek elite, although a few of them trafficked with the Habsburgs at the time of the outbreak of the Austro-Turkish war of 1716—18⁵⁹). In earlier conflicts there had been military diversions in support of the Habsburgs in the Rumanian provinces. Now the pro-Austrian boyars contented themselves with urging the occupying forces in Wallachia to work for a change in status by which Habsburg suzerainty would supplant the Ottoman. But the Habsburg forces were insufficient and the Austrians too realistic to seek an-

⁵⁷) Panaitescu, Dimitrie Cantemir, 110 ff.; C. Șerban, „Un episod al campaniei de la Prut: cucerirea Brăilei (1711)“, Academia Republicii Populare Romîne. Institutul de Istorie: Studii și Materiale de Istorie Medie, II (1957), 453 ff.

⁵⁸) D. Lekić, Spoljna politika Petra I Petrovića Njegoša (1784—1830) (Cetinje, 1950), 21 ff.

⁵⁹) Documente; Hurmuzaki, ed., VI, 150 ff.

nexation at Passarowitz. The Ducas and other members of the Austrian group took refuge in Little Wallachia when hostilities ended⁶⁰). The hospodars, their entourage and the rest of the population had remained loyal to the Porte. Only Montenegro ventured action in support of the Habsburgs but their participation was limited and Austrian aid negligible⁶¹). Nor did the subsequent war against the Porte, led by Russia and Austria between 1736 and 1739 enkindle revolutionary exertion in behalf of the Christian powers.

The pro-Russian boyar party of Moldavia sought Russian suzerainty over an autonomous province ruled by their oligarchy. But the Phanariotes and the rest of the aristocracy maintained an attitude of non-cooperation as did the peasantry. The Treaty of Nemirov, which tentatively granted Russia protection over Moldavia and Wallachia was superseded by the final agreement of Belgrade which merely granted asylum in Russia to leaders of the pro-tsarist boyar group of the Rumanian provinces⁶²). Similar proposals addressed to Vienna by several North Albanian, Bosnian and Herzegovinian malcontents, asking autonomy under Austria in iron-clad treaties of vassalage, had neither mass support nor encouragement from Austria⁶³). The fear that any uprising in the Peninsula would ultimately benefit Orthodox Russia made Vienna shy away from either seeking or accepting the support of Balkan Christendom in their anti-Turkish wars. Therefore the possibility of anti-Turkish action became even more limited after Belgrade. It would be confined until the sixties to internicine struggles in the Rumanian provinces and independent action by hajduks, clephts, armatoles and peasants elsewhere in the Balkans.

The quiescence of Balkan revolutionaries was largely due to the effectiveness of Ottoman control exerted through the Phanariote

⁶⁰) Iorga, *Istoria Românilor*, VII, 44 ff.; *Documente*; Hurmuzaki, ed., VI, 236 ff.; 659 ff.

⁶¹) S. Gopčević, *Geschichte von Montenegro und Albanien* (Gotha, 1914), 182 ff.

⁶²) C. Șerban, "Relațiile politice romîno-ruse în timpul războiului ruso-turc din 1735—1739," *Analele Romîno-Sovietice. Seria Istorie* (1956), 114 ff.; D. P. Bogdan, "Legăturile Serdarului Lupu Anastasă cu Rușii (1721—1751)," *Academia Republicii Populare Romîne. Institutul de Istorie: Studii și Materiale de Istorie Medie*, II (1957), 352 ff.

⁶³) J. Langer, "Nord-Albaniens und der Herzegowina Unterwerfungs-Anerbieten an Osterreich (1737—1739)," *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte*, LXII (1881), 247 ff.

Greeks in the Christian parts of the Peninsula and the fact that the European powers were too involved elsewhere for thirty years after Belgrade to persist in their habitual interference in Balkan affairs. Discontent with the Phanariote administration was expressed in the form of jacqueries in Serbian, Bulgarian and Rumanian areas, in the Hâncu and Durac uprising and the struggles for power between clephts, armatoles and primates in Greek lands and vladikas and chieftains in Montenegro⁶⁴). The unrest demonstrated by these manifestations was ripe to be exploited by Catherine the Great. Men like Vasilii of Montenegro and the Serdar Lupu of Moldavia, vying for power within a senescent Ottoman Empire, were alert to the advantages of collaboration with Russia⁶⁵).

As the tsarina began her preparations for war against the Porte her agents contacted strategically-located potential insurgents, the Montenegrins, Moreotes and Rumanian boyars urging their cooperation now not as participants in a common Orthodox struggle against the Infidel but as pragmatic political forces joining a supremely pragmatic aggressor⁶⁶). The Montenegro leaders were wooed and won by elaborate promises of help and cash donations surpassing the Venetian and Habsburg counter-offers⁶⁷). The Montenegro uprising of 1770 however failed to create the military diversion hoped for by Russia as the pro-Venetian, pro-Austrian and pro-Russian clans, each jockeying for position in the struggle for post-war supremacy, never coordinated their attacks against the Turkish forces. In the Rumanian provinces a similar situation prevailed⁶⁸).

⁶⁴) See in particular M. B. Petrovich, "Catherine II and a False Peter III in Montenegro," *American Slavic and East European Review*, XIV (1955), 170 ff. Also Hertzberg, *Geschichte*, III, 212 ff.; M. D. Matei, "Despre poziția claselor sociale din Moldova și Țara Românească față de războiul ruso-turc din 1768—1774," *Studii*, VI (1953), 59 ff.

⁶⁵) Bogdan, *Legăturile*, 350 ff.; Petrovich, *Catherine II*, 172 ff.; B. Brunswik, *Recueil de documents diplomatiques relatifs au Monténégro* (Constantinople, 1876), 8—9.

⁶⁶) A good summary may be found in H. Uebersberger, *Rußlands Orientpolitik in den letzten zwei Jahrhunderten* (Stuttgart, 1913), I, 286 ff.

⁶⁷) G. Stanojević, "Pojava Šćepana Malog u Crnoj Gori i interesovanje stranih sila za njega," *Istoriski Glasnik* (1951), 104 ff.; Petrovich, *Catherine II*, 172 ff.

⁶⁸) Matei, *Despre poziția*, 62 ff.; L. T. Boga, *A doua ocupație rusească a Țărilor Române* (Kishinev, 1930), 3 ff.; M. Matei, "Lupta țăranilor împotriva exploatării în timpul războaielor ruso-turce din a doua jumătate a secolului XVIII-lea," *Studii și Referate Privind Istoria României*, I (1954), 930 ff.

The pro-Russian boyar group concluded formal agreements accepting Russian suzerainty over their provinces in the event of victory. But they did not join Rumantsiev's forces. The pro-Austrian, neutralist, and Greek factions maintained a policy of carefully straddling the fence ready to proclaim their loyalty to whichever side emerged victorious at the peace table. Only the peasantry took a definite stand: one of devastating boyar estates no matter where their master's sympathies lay, and volunteering their services to the Russians as an auxiliary militia-guerilla force directed against the same boyars. The peasant forces were augmented by hajduks bent on destroying anything within their reach in the name of liberation. The Rumanian's collaboration was a highly doubtful asset to the Russians who rightly questioned the motivations of their „allies“ and spent as much time regulating domestic anarchy as in campaigning against the common enemy. Only in Greece did Orlov and Papazolis receive powerful military support⁶⁹). However, the Mainates and Moreotes, abandoned by the withdrawing Russian forces, were shortly decimated by the Albanians. The country became an area of struggle between predatory Moslems and rebellious clephts and armatoles, the last remnants of resistance against the Porte.

Although the status quo ante was essentially restored at Kuchuk Kainardji the treaty marks the end of one era and the beginning of another in the history of revolution in the Balkan Peninsula. The military and diplomatic history gained by Russia in 1774 paradoxically created conditions which were conducive to further attempts at Peninsula liberation from Turkish domination but circumscribed the scope of such activities. The further weakening of the Ottoman Empire at Kuchuk Kainardji permitted the rise, later in the century, of significant new revolutionary groups and leaders. Ali Pasha of Janina, Pazvan Oglu, Karageorge and the rural bourgeoisie and especially the Phanariote Greeks were all directly or indirectly aided by the Russian successes. However, the aims of these new leaders did not necessarily coincide with those of Russia or their revolutionary predecessors. The hajduks, clephts, armatoles as well as the peasantry were assigned roles subsidiary to the interests of the new leadership whose aim was ultimately to gain political and economic control over specific territories no longer controllable by the Porte. Independent action by peasant,

⁶⁹) Hertzberg, *Geschichte*, III, 224 ff.; C. M. Woodhouse, *The Greek War of Independence* (London, 1952), 35 ff.

clepht or armatole might well jeopardize the attainment of these goals. Nor could these new leaders, determined to exorcise all foreign domination, be it Turkish, Russian or Austrian, accept direction from Russia. Potentially insurgent groups had been disheartened by the Russian actions during the war of 1768—1774. The Rumanian peasant did not secure emancipation, the Montenegrin partisans received no assistance, the Mainates and Moreotes had been shamelessly abandoned. Cooperation from these elements could not be obtained again in the name of common action against the Infidel however often the principle of protection of the Orthodox interests were reenuniated. Thus by the end of the eighteenth century Russia, like Austria before her, had lost both prestige and support in the Balkans. Moreover, the native leaders, beneficiaries of Russian victories, were formulating an independent basis of action against the defeated and decadent Ottoman Empire. While their interests superficially coincided with those of the Russians and even the Austrians to the extent of sharing the common goal of destroying Turkish authority in the Peninsula they differed both in motivation and in specific methods of attaining this. Most significantly perhaps, none of the forces stirring the Balkan cauldron fully commanded the support of the traditionally revolutionary elements. These conflicts would radically alter the pattern of revolutionary activity in the Balkans only a score of years after Kuchuk Kainardji.