Crusader tradition in the seventeenth century European political thought

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The confrontation between the Western Christian Church and civilisation and Islam is one of the great conflicts of human history. The Age of the Crusades[1]) was one of its major chapters, starting with the first crusade and essentially coming to an end with the catastrophe which western chivalry suffered at Nicopolis. There is an extension of time if we include Portuguese navigation and the discoveries of Christopher Columbus, since the discovery of new territories and the extention of the "inhabited universe" was due to impulses received from the crusades and can be considered as their consequence. Bearing in mind, too, that political ideas concerning the unity of Europe, going back to Dubois in the early 14th century and right up to the 18th century, were formulated in terms of the crusades against the Turks,

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[1]) On the crusades: Aziz S. Atiya, The Crusade, Historiography and Bibliography. Bloomington 1962; idem, Crusade, Commerce and Culture. Indiana University Press 1962; idem, The crusade in the later middle ages. New York 1965; Ernest Barker, The crusades, in: The legacy of islam. Ed. by Sir Thomas Arnold and Alfred Guillaume. Oxford 1931, pp. 40—79; James A. Brundage, Holy war and the medieval lawyers, in: The holy war. Ed. by Thomas Patrick Murphy. Ohio State Univ. Press, Columbus 1976; H. E. J. Cowdrey, The genesis of the crusades: The springs of Western ideas of holy war, in: The holy war, ibidem; Carl Erdman, The origin of the idea of Crusade. Princeton University Press 1977; Hans Eberhard Mayer, The crusades. Oxford 1988; Nicolas Iorga, Brève histoire des Croisades, et de leurs fondations en Terre Sainte. Paris 1924; idem, Notes et extraits pour servir à l'histoire des croisades au XVe siècle. V, 1476—1500. Bucarest 1915; idem, Philippe de Mèziéres, 1327—1405. London 1973; Louis Maimbourg, Histoire des croisades pour la delivrance de la Terre Sainte. Paris 1682; Frédéric Mauro, Die europäische Expansion. Stuttgart 1984; M. Michaud, Histoire des croisades. Paris 1838, vol. I—V; Steven Runciman, A history of the Crusades, vol. I—III. Cambridge 1952; Jonathan Riley-Smith, What were the crusades?, The Macmillan Press LTD, London, New York 1977, 1978; R. Schwoebel, The shadow of the crescent: The renaissance image of the Turks (1453—1517). Nieuwkoop, B. de Graaf 1967; Michel Villey, La Croisade, Essai sur la formation d'une théorie juridique. Paris 1942.

allows one to realize that the crusades' traditions against the Turks, had a long life indeed. In this study we analyse the essence of the crusades' traditions, how these ideas changed in the course of European history, and how the traditional idea of a crusade against the Turks influenced the European, and primarily French, political plans of the 17th century.

I.

The crusades as a Holy War were the product and expression of medieval spirituality, more precisely of the Western-European chivalrous and religious culture. The Christian state of the Middle Ages, led by the Pope and the Emperor, appeared as an integral state, as a "Respublica Christiana", in which the Christian Church was intertwined with the state. Christianity, on the other hand, was based on a mission, ie, on the spreading of the faith. Assuming political functions, it was confronted with the problem of using war as means for this mission. The Holy Writ is not unambiguous regarding war, thus the position of the Church in its involvement with secular matters was indeed problematical. Would it be satisfied with a peaceful mission in its relations with the outside world, or would it provide arguments for making war permissible? The latter proved to be the case, showing that war could not be eliminated from the European culture. Pacifism, however, continued to be present as well as an alternative to Holy War. As consequence, two alternatives continued to coexist, ie, the acceptence of war as an instrument of the Christian mission, and the rejection of this approach.

The Papacy finally came out in support of the principle of a Holy War. Regarding its essence, Saint Augustin[2] had already argued that one may kill in self-defence, and that defence against force was permitted, counting as a just cause[3]. God himself may order war, and men who make war obeying God to punish the evil and the unlawful, are thus serving justice[4]. All this also applies to ways of dealing with barbarians and heretics who attack Chistians professing the true faith, that is those who embody the city of the devil and confront the city of God[5]. The notion of Holy War was accepted even before the crusades. The Papacy interpreted the Holy War as a war ordered by God, and which was based on just self-defence. It could therefore be waged against all those who unjustly attacked Christianity or its goods, chattels and lands. In this sence a war in defence of the faith was accepted. This is reflected in three essential themes that can be clearly isolated in the ideas of the crusades:

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[2] Saint Augustin, La cité de dieu. Œuvres de Saint Augustin. Bibliothèque Augustienne. Desclée de Brouwer. Paris 1960, vol. 33—37.

[3] Ibidem, vol. 37, p. 265.

[4] Ibidem, p. 261.

[5] Ibidem, vol. 36, p. 667.

— Medieval legal thinking argued against basically pacifist religious doc-
trines by stating that God could order a war against the enemies of the
Christian faith — including both barbarians and heretics — in self-de-
fence and to oppose injustice. Such a war was a Holy War. The crusades
were thus Holy Wars against the enemies of the faith. Such a fight could
also be a means towards the forgiveness of sins for those taking part in
it. The ultimate aim was to win over the opponent, be he a heathen or a
heretic.

— Recovering the Holy Land, which had earlier been in the possession of
Christianity, was also an essential theme. A Christian state (the Latin
Kingdom of Jerusalem) was forcefully established and maintained; it was
aimed to become a military and an economic base in maintaining contacts
with Asia, and in furthering the mission, ie, to spread Christianity to the
Muslim East. This missionary and conquering zeal was the source of both
permanent conflicts and permanent contacts between Christianity and
Islam.

— The crusades were also used to reinforce the idea of a Christian unity,
principally the ideology of a Respublica Christiana led by the Pope and
the Emperor. The crusades were conducted by the Pope, and it was the
duty of every Christian ruler to take part and to respond to the Papal
appeal.

The system of ideas represented at the time of the crusades considered
Islam as the eternal enemy of Christianity, against which the Christians
must unit their forces in the form of a crusade. The crusade as a Holy War
became some sort of a tradition of European history. This tradition also cre-
ated a general animosity toward Islam, which later influenced the relation
of Europeans against the Turks, too[6]. This is very well reflected in the Euro-
pean political literature on the Turkish question[7]. The political plans[8]
themselves demonstrate that, starting with the 14th century and right up to
the end of the 18th, joint actions against the Turks in form of crusades also
provided for a potential framework for a Christian, ie, European, unity[9]. In
what follows, we will attempt to give some answers to questions related to
this tradition, namely:

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[6]) This sort of historical tradition one can find in the special literature as a
stereotype. See Ernst Robert Curtius, Europäische Literatur und lateinisches
Mittelalter. München 1948, pp. 89—112; idem, Begriff einer historischen
Topik, in: Max L. Baeumer, Toposforschung. Darmstadt 1973, pp. 1—19;
Bruno Naarden, De Spiegel der Barbaren: Socialistisch Europa en Revolutio-
nair Rusland (1848—1923). Groningen 1986, Chpt. 1, pp. 7—28.

[7]) See C. Göllner, Turcica. Die europäischen Türkendrucke des XVI. Jahr-
hunderts. Bucuresti, Baden-Baden 1967, vol. 1—2.

[8]) See J. ter Meulen, G. Berlage, J. de Huizinga, Bibliographie du mou-
vement de la paix avant 1899. Période 1480—1776. La Haye 1936.

[9]) Jacob ter Meulen underlined that the necessity of the common fight

— How did this historical tradition change in the course of European history?
— What was the background of its force which maintainted it for so long?
— How did this tradition influence the development of European political thinking in general?

II.

The Holy Wars were actually directed against the Saracens, Norsemen, Moors, Mameluks, later the Turks, etc, ie, peoples that surrounded and threatened Christianity. The Crusaders themselves were in fact rooted in the Spanish reconquista. When the Pope *Gregory VII* wanted to reconquer the territory occupied by the Moors in Spain, he entrusted a French nobleman with the organisation of the campaign, asking all Christian princes to follow his banner and offer support. The Pope's aim was the spread of Christianity, and his role in the reconquista, as it were, prefigured the crusades. The first "real" crusade was then proclaimed by his successor, Pope *Urban II*, in 1095, at Clermont Ferrand.

The period between 1095 and 1291, that is from the proclamation of the First Crusade to the Fall of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, is the Age of the Crusades in the narrow sense of the term. The aims of the crusades were various: they included the reconquest of the Holy Land, the repossession of the Holy Sepulchre, the conquest and pillage of Constantinople, a tragic childrens' crusade rooted in an unbelievable fanaticism, and the use of diplomacy by the Emperor *Frederik II*, who favoured diplomacy rather than war. The usage of diplomacy was indeed something new and unusual, but the greatest deviation from the original aims was undoubtedly the conquest of Constantinople, ie, a war directed against Christians, albeit Greek Orthodox, and not against Muslims.

In spite of the apparent changes in basic motives of the crusades, which were the consequences of the gradual decline in the influence of the Papacy and the growing strength of the secular power, the idea of the crusades continued to remain alive in the late Middle Ages. The 14th century can really be called the Age of the Late Crusades in the full sence of the term. The crusades continued between 1292 and 1344 and followed each other in a quick succession between 1344 and 1396. Earlier, the Holy War had concentrated on the Near-East, whereas, in the Late Middle Ages, it spread to more

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against the turks meant an important framework for the European federativ ideas from the age of Dubois to the 18th century. Jakob ter Meulen, Der Gedanke der Internationalen Organisation in seiner Entwicklung, 1300—1800. Den Haag 1917.

distant horizons well beyond the Holy Land, to Anatolia, Egypt, or North Africa.

The disaster suffered by western chivalry at Nicopolis in 1396 deeply depressed the Europeans and essentially meant the end of the crusades. After that, Western Christians did not really dare to engage in adventures aimed at subduing Islam. The fall of Jerusalem in 1187 and of Acre in 1291, as well as the Turkish conquest of Constantinople in 1453, all stood for the strengthening of Islam in the eyes of Christians. A new age started in East-West relations, the "Age of Counter-Crusades", when Christian Crusades acquired a defensive nature confronting the corresponding Muslim *jihad*.

In fact, the crusades must really be written off as a failure. The causes include dissension amongst the leaders, but also the decline of a "World Governement" headed by the Pope and the Emperor and its replacement by new states, crystallising around kings with the support of the bourgeois middle-class, and showing increased national awareness. Furthermore, numerous domestic events and problems within the Church led to less attention being given to the crusades. Such events included the Hundred Years' War between England and France, or the power crisis of the Emperor in Germany. Life was restructured in Europe, and the Church declined in power. Also, the reconquista against the Moors in Spain became, in fact, a national liberation war and, on its conclusion, it was almost automatically turned into a conquista, ie, the age of the Spanish Conquest.

A further, very essential, cause of failure of the Crusades must be mentioned, and that is the great geographical discoveries which widened horizons and concentrated attention on colonisation, on conquests promising great potential wealth. Missionaries had accompanied the Crusades and had then moved on, with some of them reaching Mongolia and China. A guiding principle was that the nations beyond the lands of Islam could be christianised and could become allies against the Turks. In that sense geographical discoveries can be interpreted as a partial consequence of the Late Crusades. As an example, reaching China via a route bypassing the Muslim lands was really the purpose of Columbus' search for a passage to India. The discovery of America, however, changed the whole course of history, and the nature of the crusades as well.

Face to face with the inhabitants of the New World the question arose how Christians should behave towards people hitherto unknown and whose lands were conquered by Christians unable to make use of the arguments of a Holy War. If, like *Vitoria*[10]), they gave some thought to the situation, they

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[10]) Franciscus de Vitoria, De Indis, recenter inventis et de jure belli hispanorum in Barbaros. Relectiones. Lateinischer Text nebst deutscher Übersetzung herausg. von Walter Schätzel. Tübingen 1952. (Die Klassiker des Völkerrechts.)

certainly had to differentiate between these people and the well-armed Turks who could respond to the challenge of the crusades with counter crusades of their own. *Vitoria* opposed wars motivated by differences in religion[11]) and formulated the essential principles of peaceful missionary activity[12]). This was a step in the direction of the assumption of the "White Man's Burden" by a European society conscious of its higher culture. The ideas of the crusades related to alien nations and cultures were thus, in the course of the discoveries and colonisation, replaced by notions of the White Man's Burden. What had originally been of peaceful intention could not, however, stay peaceful in practice. In the majority of cases, in one way or another, aggression was the end result. The subjection of strange peoples, and the mere fact of conquest, became more and more obvious and Western Christianity, with an unstoppable elan, advanced in every part of the earth that could be reached.

As history took his new direction, East-West relations concurrently featured the Turkish "counter crusades"[13]), in other words, the expansion of the Turks. Christianity was forced on the defensive against the Ottoman Empire which kept on growing in strength in the 15th and 16th centuries. All this happened at a time when in Europe the crusader, Holy War type of thinking was really in decline. The Christian princes tended to take up a passive — or necessarily defensive — position vis-à-vis the Turks. And yet the Ottoman challenge continued as a threat to the nations of Europe for many years to come, demanding more or less intensive, but permanent attention. Still it must be said that at this time the Turkish question was a problem primarily to those exposed to Ottoman attack. Old crusader attitudes could no longer be revived at the time of counter crusades.

III.

Five major facts provided primarily evidence that the attitude to crusades had fundamentally changed. These are detailed below.

1. The first issue was a change in respect to the relations of some European powers to the Ottoman Empire. *Francis I*, king of France, solicited the support of the Porte in his conflict with the Holy Roman Emperor. This was soon followed by the agreement on the socalled capitulations which provided important privileges for French traders in the Middle-East. From that time onwards the Ottoman Empire became part of the European concert of nations, and the

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[11]) Ibidem, p. 129.

[12]) Ibidem, No. 18, p. 115.

[13]) B. Lewis calls the period of the great Turkish expansion the period of the Turkish counter crusades. Bernard Lewis, The muslim discovery of Europe. New York, London 1982.

Sultans and the Grand Viziers were able to exploit fully for some centuries all the advantages which rivalries between European powers offered them, first of all the conflict between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France.

Important trading relations also came into existence between the Ottoman Empire and other countries in Europe[14]). Furthermore, rivalry between the European powers, and specific commercial interests linked to Turkish territory, as well as the great wave of European expansion, diverted attention from the Ottoman Empire, thus prolonging its survival by many years, and with it that of the Turkish problem.

2. The second fact of interest was the decline of the Papacy, the principle manager of the crusades, due to the Reformation and the progress of nation states. As a consequence of this decline, the conflicts between different religions as a cause of a war began to lose its persuasive power. Although the leaders of areas under Catholic influence endeavoured to keep alive the spirit of religious wars in East-West conflicts, at least on the level of ideas, supporters of the Reformation wished to confine religious questions to the private sphere. One of the important consequences of this was that European thinkers tried to eliminate the idea of a religious war, that is of a war fought over matters of faith, from international law. As a first step *Luther*, proclaiming the Reformation, initiated a major movement against the crusades. *Luther* declared the crusades to be an evil fruit of papal policy which lacked any legal basis. He thought of the Turks as the incarnation of the city of the devil and stressed that the devil could only be fought by the improvement of the individual. Religion was everyone's private business, one could not wage wars over religion, since religion referred to the relationship between an individual and his God. Only defensive wars were justified against the Turks, under the leadership of the Emperor, since the Turks unjustly attacked Christian territories, primarily those ruled by the Emperor[15]). Thus, during the Reformation, the stress shifted to defence against the Turks.

Following *Luther* a growing number of European thinkers argued that wars should not be fought over matters of faith. *Vitoria* rejected wars of religion[16]). He was followed by *Grotius*[17]), *Crucé*[18]), and many others. At the

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[14]) About the commercial contacts see F. Braudel, La Mediterranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II. Paris 1985; G. B. Depping, Histoire du commerce entre le Levant et l'Europe depuis les Croisades jusqu'à la fondation des colonies d'Amerique. Paris 1830; Robert Mantran, Istambul dans le second moitié du XVIIᵉ siècle. Paris 1962; Paul Masson, Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au XVIIᵉ siècle. Paris 1897.

[15]) Martin Luther, Eine Heerpredigt wider den Türken. Wittenberg 1529 and idem, Vom Kriege wider den Türken. Wittenberg 1542.

[16]) F. de Vitoria, De Indis, p. 129.

[17]) Hugo Grotius, Le droit de la guerre et de la paix. Vol. I—III, Amsterdam 1688, vol. II, chapter XX, paragraph 47—50.

[18]) Emeric Crucé, Le Nouveau Cynée. Philadelphia 1909, p. 14.

end of the 17th century, *Locke*[19]) drew the final conclusion, ie, the need for a separation between church and state.

At the same time within the Ottoman Empire, as a result of an Asian type domestic system inclined to stagnation, and differing from European ways, the power and influence of Islam remained strong. The idea of Holy War remained therefore much more alive in areas under the influence of Islam than in Christian lands.

3. During the period of the Ottoman expansion, defence against the Turks was the ongoing duty in Europe (at least up to the 17th century when, as a consequence of the battle of Lepanto, it gradually became apparent that the Ottoman Empire was weakening and could be defeated). The doctrine of a just war, replacing that of a holy war, put the emphasis on defence, since the Ottoman Empire had unjustly attacked, pillaged and occupied Christian territories. The reconquering the Holy Land was no longer a motivating force. Since a war of religion was beginning to be unacceptable, the Holy War aspect of the fight against the Turks gradually abated. Defensive plans of the 16th century concentrated on ways of organising the fight against the Turks. The greatest problem was to find ways of cooperation amongst the princes of Europe who all tried to gain some profit at each other's expense. This cooperation was indeed necessary; as on their own all the rulers, even the *Habsburg* emperor, were too weak to confront the Turks. In trying to solve this problem, *De La Noue*[20]), a huguenot nobleman and military leader, revived the idea of a European arbitration council, first suggested by *Dubois* early in the 14th century[21]). *De La Noue* also drafted a large-scale and detailed plan for a crusade against the Turks. For his part *Busbequius*, a diplomat in the service of the Emperor *Rudolf II*, put a lot of emphasis in his plans on an overall reform of the military[22]). All this served the aim of creating a serious force to confront the Turk.

4. Once Lepanto made it clear that the Turks could be defeated, the idea of conquest and expansion came to the fore. All this, naturally, was closely related to a global political thinking that was taking shape in the course of the conquest of the newly discovered territories, and the concurrently formulated idea of a world mission of the White Man's Burden, which im-

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[19]) John Locke, Epistola de tolerantia. Budapest 1982, p. 63 (Levél a vallási türelemről).

[20]) François de la Noue, Discours politiques et militaires. Published by F. E. Sutcliffe. Paris, Genève 1967. Vingtdeuxiesme Discours, Que les princes chréstiens estans bien unis ensemble peuvent en quatre ans chasser les Turcs de l'Europe, pp. 437—516.

[21]) Pierre Dubois, De Recuperatione Terrae Sanctae. Published and edited by A. Picard. Paris 1891.

[22]) The turkish letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, Imperial ambassador at Constantinople, 1554—1562. Oxford 1968, pp. 112—113 and pp. 237—241.

plied the endeavour converting the whole world to Christianity. In essence, this meant the application of the principle of *cuius regio eius religio* to overseas territories. This was the more modern form of ideology which replaced the ideology of the crusades[23]).

The background of this development was that, within European politics, the emphasis shifted to the power aspirations of newly independent states, and to their political and commercial interests which covered the whole world. The idea of a national mission as governing the policy of independent states gaining in strength was closely connected with what we said above. Since, owing to the Turkish threat, the idea of Christian unity continued as a living tradition, a European nation which claimed to be the most powerful and the most civilised could see it as its own mission to organise peace and unity in Europe, using a modernised version of Respublica Christiana, the earlier papal and imperial commonwealth, as a model. In a broader perspective, it could also be the mission of the same nation to create world unity. The rivalry of two such nations characterised the 17th century: one was the Kingdom of France, and the other the Holy Roman Empire.

This sence of mission was particularly strong in France which already formed an integrated nation. It was present at the time of *Richelieu*[24]) in the first part of the 17th century and was further strengthened in the reign of the Most Christian Majesty *Louis XIV* whose aim was to bring French gloire to full flower. Since the French policy pushed into the background the conquest of the New World, they maintained their interest in the Orient and they remained very active on the old battlefield of the East. For the Ottoman Empire this meant that, early in the 17th century, and in addition to the reviving crusader spirit, the French sense of mission also served as a cause for the attempt to convert the Turks to Christianity. Since the Turkish question remained essentially unsolved, the crusader principles continued to be present in the French policy, indeed they even flourished early in the 17th century[25]). But, by then, they were linked to a sense of mission of a Christian culture as well as the concealing French desires for expansion and great power aspirations. *Père Joseph, Richelieu*'s "éminence grise", was the great figure of the Christian mission operating in the Ottoman Empire. He even

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[23]) Heinz Gollwitzer, Geschichte des weltpolitischen Denkens. I, Vom Zeitalter der Entdeckungen bis zum Beginn des Imperialismus. Göttingen 1972, pp. 73—74, p. 162.

[24]) Georges Livet, L'équilibre européen de la fin du XVe à la fin du XVIIIe siècle. Paris 1976, pp. 70—72.

[25]) Between 1600 and 1620 about 11 projets against the Turks came into the world. See T. G. Djuvara, Cent Projets de Partage de la Turquie (1281—1913). Paris 1914; Gérard Tongas, Les relations de la France avec l'Empire Ottoman. Toulouse 1942.

tried to organise, early in the 17th century, a crusade aimed at restoring the Byzantine Empire on the territory of the ottoman Empire[26]).

5. The "Discovery" of the Ottoman Empire and of the Turkish society had also become necessary. At the time of the crusades there was just about no interest in the eternal enemy of the Faith, but now that the Turks themselves became prospective converts in the eyes of Europeans, and that commercial and specific political cooperation with the Ottoman Empire was a recognised fact for Christians, obtaining information on this society was a matter of importance[27]). The presence of the missionaries, of merchants, of the official representatives of the European powers, and of travellers in the Ottoman Empire, became important in this respect, too, showing a lively European interest in the area. One could also say that sound information was needed for the successful organisation of a defence against the Turks, as well as for the later wars which expelled the Turks from Central Europe. A start was made in the second half of the 17th century to develop oriental studies as a scholarly discipline and on securing information on every aspect of life in the Ottoman Empire[28]). In spite of all this, however, European mentality continued to keep its distance from the Turcs, which is well reflected in contemporary European thoughts on international law, a discipline flowering at that time.

IV.

The idea of Christian (ie, European) unity against the eternal enemy, unrealistic as it may have been, continued to be a living tradition in the late period of the Turkish wars, and influenced both the theory and the practice. This was the consequence of the facts that, on one hand, Turkish attacks created permanent disquiet amongst Christians, and, on the other hand, a solution of the Turkish question could only be expected based upon a cooperation amongst Christian rulers. In reality, the Ottoman Empire profited from the rivalry amongst the European powers and, as a result, it was indeed in a position to threaten many countries in Europe, producing disquiet there. In the course of the rivalry between France and the *Habsburgs* the Ottoman Empire became part of the balance of power in Europe, which was recognised, and hence exploited, by 17th century politicians[29]).

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[26]) Le véritable Père Josef Capucin. Amsterdam 1734; Gustave Fagniez, Le père Joseph et Richelieu (1577—1638). Vol. I—II, Paris 1894, pp. 120—182.

[27]) Pierre Martino, L'Orient dans la littérature française au XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècle. Paris 1906; C. D. Rouillard, The Turk in French history. Tought and Literature (1520—1660). (Études de littérature étrangères et comparée, 13.) Paris 1941.

[28]) P. Martino, L'Orient ...

[29]) Francis Bacon, A Discours of war, in: The Philosophical Works of Fran-

European thinkers themselves endeavoured to keep alive the idea of Christian unity in this age which strove to establish a universal empire that would conquer the world. A key problem for 17th century political philosophers was precisely how the unity of Christianity, that is the cooperation amongst the states of Europe, could be created. This was a real issue since Christianity, which wanted to conquer this World for the True Faith, wished to be a society that came as close possible to the City of God in the Augustianian sense of the term, fulling a mission, attracting all the nations, that is everybody. Finally, under the influence of the tradition of the crusade against the Turks, the European political thinkers began to meditate how it would be possible to organise effective cooperation amongst states; this led to the foundations of international law.

All this is reflected in numerous 17th century political plans[30] which had the unity of Europe and a peaceful European political order as their subject. In majority, they wrapped their message into the traditional framework of the crusade against the Turks, as the eternal enemy of the Christianity which always threatened Christians. This continued even into the 18th century, after the Turks were defeated at Vienna, when Christian unity against the Turks was in fact an empty tradition without substance any more. The following plans of the 17th and the early 18th centuries are typical in this sense: the plan of *Emeric Crucé* (1623), *Grotius* (1625), *Comenius* (1645), *Sully* (1638), *William Penn* (1692), *John Bellers* (1710), *Abbot Saint-Pierre* (1712), Leibniz (1672), *Michel Febvre* (1682), the Grand Dessein of *Louis XIV* (1686—1687), and the plan of marquis d'*Argenson*. They are all particularly interesting in respect of the Turkish problem.

In the first half of the 17th century *Crucé* was the only thinker who could broke with the tradition of the crusades against the Turks in the European political thought. His "Le Nouveau Cynée"[31] was essentially the first such plan which covered not only Christian Europe but the whole world, dis-

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cis Bacon. Vol. II, London 1733, p. 168; Cardinal de Richelieu, Testament Politique. Edition critique par Louis André. Paris 1947, p. 29; Louis de Rohan, Maximes des Princes et estats souverains. Cologne 1665; Ph. de Bethune, Le conseiller d'estat ou Recueil des plus generales considerations servant au maniment des Affaires publiques. Paris 1645, pp. 50—51.

[30] On the 17th centuries political plans: Bibliographie du mouvement de la paix avant 1899, periode: 1480—1776. Éd. Jacob ter Meulen, J. Huizinga, G. Berlage. La Haye 1936; Jakob ter Meulen, Der Gedanke ...; F. H. Hinsley, Power and the pursuit of peace. Theory and practice in the history of relations between the states. Cambridge 1963; Kurt von Raumer, Ewiger Friede. Friedensrufe und Friedenspläne seit der Renaissance. München 1953; D. de Rougemeot, Vingt-huit siècles d'Europe. La conscience européenne à travers les textes. Paris 1961.

[31] Emeric Cruocé, Le Nouveau Cynée. (Translated into English from the original French text of 1623.) Philadelphia 1909.

cussing as it did the creation of an international world organisation on the basis of the status quo, accepting the sovereignty of states. *Cruce* argued that a reconciliation between Christianity and Islam, the faiths of enemies confronting each other, would be a great and necessary step forward on the road to universal peace. Religion was not the business of the rulers of this world but of God[32]). Thus *Cruce* does not merely propose the union of Christians but truly a world federation. Differences in religion cannot be an obstacle to a universal peace. There must be freedom of religion and freedom of thought. He is the first to accept that religious freedom and tolerance must cover Turkish society as well, and that the Ottoman Empire be included in the world community of peace. As regards the hierarchy of rulers he places the Pope, the head of the Catholic Church, first and the Sultan second, who is a powerful ruler with great authority and who includes Constantinople, the seat of the Eastern Empire, amongst his possessions. Third place is due to the Emperor, as the secular lord of the Christians, and fourth to the King of France[33]). It was up to the King of France to conclude peace with the Sultan since the French and the Turks had long been allies[34]).

Following *Cruce, Comenius* invited the Turks in the Angelus Pacis[35]), to a world peace congress. *Comenius* was a pacifist through and through and his approach to the Turkish question was that of a peaceful mission. He wished to convert the Turks to a universal Christian faith which would cover everybody and which would be the religion of the empire of eternal peace. He thought it necessary that the Bible be translated into Turkish for that purpose[36]).

Grotius and *Sully*, the two great contemporaries, both stressed the traditional principle of the need for Christian unity in the interest of a crusade against the Turks. As against the unrealistic theory of a universal world unity, *Grotius*, basing himself on European realities, proposed the cooperation of independent states, headed by a court of arbitration that could apply sanctions, prefiguring an age where independent states would obey the law of nations[37]). However, he considered war against the Turks on the old basis to be unavoidable, and to be the common cause of all Christians, it

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[32]) Ibidem, p. 14.

[33]) Ibidem, p. 108.

[34]) Ibidem, pp. 342—344.

[35]) Jan Amos Comenius, De Engel des Vredes (Angelus Pacis). Utrecht 1667, pp. 51, 55, 58—59, 70.

[36]) Jan Amos Comenius, Allgemeiner Weckruf mit der Vorrede an die Europäer. Transl. and ed. by H. Schönebaum. Leipzig 1924, pp. 58, 90, 130—141.

[37]) Hugo Grotius, Le droit de la guerre et de la paix. Amsterdam 1688, vol. II. chapitre XXIII, paragraph VIII, p. 598.

being a defensive war[38]). It is unlikely that he had any other solution in mind.

Sully's often reprinted Mémoires present his famous plan for a European rearrangement as the Grand Dessein of King *Henry IV*[39]). His plan was such a skillful amalgam of the political ideas of his time that it proved highly influential not only amongst his contemporaries but also amongst succeeding generations. Even *Napoleon* found much in *Sully* that he thought attractive[40]).

What is important for our purposes is that *Sully* presents the new European political order in the framework of the common fight of Christians against the Turks. The essence is the creation of a balance of power in Europe, following a new division of territories, if necessary with the use of force in a war[41]). The Respublica Christiana thus created would have its own joint army for the fight against the enemies of Christianity, primarily the Turks, and in order to implement the mission of Christianity. In contrast to *Cruce, Sully* declares it to be the duty of the new, more precisely rearranged, European federation of states based on the balance of power to conduct an ongoing war against the Turks, expelling them from Europe and confining them to Asia. Maintaining a standing army for an uninterrupted war against the infidel would have been the duty of all of the fifteen new states. All this is justified by the barbarian nature of the Turks. He argues that in the case of non-Christians where there is no hope of conversion to any Christian denomination, persecution is the only answer. *Sully* also outlined the plan of major campaign against the Turks which was to be managed by the Council of Europe. He wished a newly strengthened Hungary to be the bastion of Europe once again, and not of the Holy Roman Empire[42]).

Sully combined crusader and missionary ideas. Once the Christian princes had expelled the Turks, thanks to the lately established United European

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[38]) "Que tous les Chrétiens sont obliger de faire Alliance contre les ennemis de la foy Chrétienne"; Hugo Grotius, Traicte de la verité de la Religion Chrestienne. Amsterdam 1636, p. 12 and 183.

[39]) Mémoires de Maximilien de Bethune duc de Sully, Principal Ministre de Henry le Grand, I—II. Londres 1745, Book XXX, pp. 303—346. The origin of this plan is discussed in the historical literature. About the plan of *Sully* see Hardouin de Pérefix, Histoire du Roy Henry le Grand. Amsterdam 1661, pp. 368–395; Theodor Kükelhaus, Der Ursprung des Planes vom Ewigen Frieden in den Mémoiren des Herzogs von Sully. Berlin 1893; C. Pfister, "Les economies Royales" de Sully et le Grand Dessein de Henri IV., *Revue Historique*, No. 54—56 (1894); Rudolf von Albertini, Das politische Denken in Frankreich zur Zeit Richelieus. Marburg 1951.

[40]) Jakob ter Meulen, Der Gedanke ..., pp. 161—170.

[41]) Ibidem, p. 344.

[42]) Ibidem, pp. 320—323.

Confederation and following a crusade, they could set about fulfilling the Christian world mission. He argues that the rulers of Europe must surely approve his plan to expel the Turks. Once they could feel confident that there was no danger to the power of the Europeans any more, nothing to force them to divide, they would make a start on seeking allies in Asia, and on the shores of Africa, and in the neighbourhood of the countries of Europe. His only proviso is that, when such newly established Kingdoms eventually become part of the Republique Crétienne, none of them be ruled by someone who already holds high rank in the European community of states[43]).

The plan essentially rests on three or four simple ideas: the territorial re-arrangement or redivision of Europe which would serve to reduce the power of the House of *Habsburg*, the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, the creation of religious peace, the establishment of a joint council of states which would deal with conflicts through arbitration, and the creation of a common European army, primarily for war against the Turks. He combines the ideas of the past and of his own times, including that of Christian unity, Crusader ideology, the establishment of religious peace, the idea of universal peace, a European arbitration council, and the balance of power in Europe. The role of the French sense of mission is essential in the plan. *Sully* looks at the King of France as the sovereign with a calling to create peace in Europe. In organising a crusade, what *Sully* really has in mind is to establish French domination over Europe and the world. Settling the Turkish question is absolutely necessary for this purpose. This is the new line which made him so influential in his own time and for generations to come.

There was nothing essentially new in the writings of *William Penn* (1692), of *John Bellers* (1710), and of *Charles Francois Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre* (1712) in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. They took *Sully*'s design as their starting point and essentially reproduced those parts which dealt with peace in Europe. They touched on the Turkish question, but only conventionally, there was no emphasis on it. They did not go as far as *Cruce* who included the Ottoman Empire in his universal peace plan, giving it a place in the international council. Like *Sully*, they tended to argue in favour of an international organisation which would cover Europe, essentially to allow the European princes to regain their moral and actual superiority over the Turks.

All this is most evident in *William Penn*'s plan (1692)[44]. *Penn*, as it were, and following *Comenius*, argued that the standing of Christians would grow in Turkish eyes if the Europeans proved capable of establishing an organi-

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[43]) Ibidem, p. 323.
[44]) William Penn, Ein Essay zum gegenwärtigen und zukünftigen Frieden von Europa durch Schaffung eines europäischen Reichstags, Parlaments oder Staatenhauses. 1693, in: Kurt von Raumer, Ewiger Friede, pp. 335—336.

sation of that sort. After all, all the Turks had witnessed so far were bloody wars among Europeans and against themselves. *Penn*, who rejected war as a problem — solving measure, argued that a Christian alliance, if it could be established, would certainly provide security against a Turkish attack[45]). The end of the war would create great prosperity in Europe and the Christians would grow in strength. The Turks would not be victorious as frequently and as decisively, if not a single ruler in Europe played their game. All the same, *Penn* was inclined to exclude the Turks from the European union[46]).

Abbot *Saint-Pierre*'s famous eternal peace plan (1712)[47]), and its later amended editions, showed that he was not capable of taking an unambiguous position on the Turkish question. The first edition of 1712 included both the Russians and the Turks. In the 1713 edition[48]) he suggests that the nations of Asia should produce their own federation which would then enter into a defensive alliance with the European federation, mutually recognising the status quo. He stressed that the aim of the union would not be the reconciliation of religions but the pacification of the nations[49]). Three years later he already argued for the exclusion of the Turks from the European federation, in keeping with the *Henry IV* Grand Dessein. He felt that the expulsion of the Turks from Europe was a necessary undertaking for Christian rulers which would take place on the establishment of the European federation. Finally he plumped for the Asian Union to bridge the gap. The European Union ought to favour the establishment of a similar union in Asia to do away with the Asian threat. Indeed, in the interests of a quiet life and the free pursuit of trade[50]), Abbot *Saint-Pierre* also argued that wars between the Turks and their neighbours in Asia must be prevented, since such wars served the military training of Turks[51]). He also spoke of the use of sanctions against the Turks. Abbot *Saint-Pierre* in no way follows *Crucé*; indeed, he considered the anti-Turkish undertaking or the Holy Alliance to be paradigmatic. One can wonder (just like, eg, Marquis *d'Argenson* did) what *Abbot Saint-Pierre* really had in mind. As a pacifist he had to avoid any mention of conquest, but is that not what he means, by the good which the realisation of his plan would mean, that is by freedom for world trade? How would Christianity relate to other, non-Christian, nations if universal peace of the Abbot *Saint-Pierre* kind were

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[45]) Ibidem, pp. 335—336.

[46]) Ibidem, pp. 337.

[47]) Abbé de *Saint Pierre*, Mémoires pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe. Cologne 1712.

[48]) Abbé de *Saint Pierre*, Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe. Utrecht 1713.

[49]) J. ter Meulen, Der Gedanke, p. 189.

[50]) Ibidem, p. 190.

[51]) Saint Pierre, Abrégé du projet de paix perpetuelle. Inventé par le roi Henry le Grand. Rotterdam 1729, p. 143.

established? Would not the result be the same as in the case of the natives of America and the East Indians[52])?

In the awareness of all this *John Bellers* warned his contemporaries that Muslims were men, with the same talents and minds as other men. They desire the same chances and wish to be accepted as men like all others. Not to accept them would be a great mistake and would lead to a continuous state of war in Europe[53]). *Bellers* looked to a European Union and to the extension of this peace alliance to the Turks for a solution to the Turkish question.

When, in the second half of the 17th century, the Turks were again on the warpath in Europe, as a reaction the emphasis shifted from mere defence to a show of strength against the Turks and to organising an offensive campaign. The spirit of the crusades was revived, regardless of the fact that the idea had been much critised. *Leibniz* quoted the French minister *Pomponne* who said in 1672 that the crusades had gone out of fashion since *Saint Louis*[54]). *Louis Maimbourg*, a 17th century historian of the crusades, also argued that their time had passed[55]). Nevertheless, in the second half of the 17th century, the crusader idea once again appeared as a motivation in the rhetorics of world politics.

The crusader idea between 1650 and 1750 covers a broad spectrum. It appears in Papal appeals for an anti-Turkish league over and above chimaerae and day-dreams of courtiers and warlords that are used purely as a rhetorical device in arguments designed to further political integration and in the making of everyday plans. But there was no more talk of a holy war against the Turks waged by a united Christianity. Crusader ideology was employed in a secularised form, that is, in that period of the Turkish wars real political objectives were expressed in crusader guise[56]). Most contemporaries spoke about wars fought by Christianity, although at that time the religious component of the confrontation was minimal.

Leibniz's plan was particularly characteristic of the second half of the 17th century[57]). All in all, what he outlined was the plan of a major anti-Turkish undertaking, as a part of a world-alliance, in which all rulers, Christian and

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[52]) Journal et Mémoires du Marquis d'Argenson. Paris 1859, p. 365.

[53]) John Bellers, Some reason for an European state, 1710, in: John Bellers (1654—1725), Quaker, Economist and social reformer. His writings reprinted, with a memoir by Ruth Fry. London, Toronto, e. a. 1935, p. 103.

[54]) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe. Hrsg. von der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin 1963 (4. Reihe: Politische Schriften, 2), p. 671.

[55]) *Maimbourg* considered the hundred years war like the ending of the crusades. Louis Maimbourg, Histoire des croisades pour la delivrance de la Terre Sainte. Paris 1682. Épître 3—4, p. 299.

[56]) H. Gollwitzer, Geschichte, p. 162.

[57]) Mémoire de Leibniz à Louis XIV. sur la conquête de l'Égypte, publié avec

non-Christian, would join. Similar ideas are found in the plans of *Père Joseph* and *Campanella*[58]) and in the late plans for crusades. Like them, *Leibniz* believed that the subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire would also rise in rebellion, and that Christian rule would replace that of Islam. He wished to establish a new world order after the defeat of Islam, not in the form of a universal monarchy but as an *arbitrum rerum*[59]). *Leibniz* believed that European culture had a mission in the world.

What *Leibniz* really wanted to do with his famous Egyptian design was to support the Mayence court in its efforts to create a balance of power in Europe. In 1672 he suggested to the French court that, rather than to attack the Netherlands, they should attack the Ottoman Empire, namely Egypt. *Leibniz's* arguments for a more active French policy in the Levant promised to be fruitful in the long run. Mediterranean and Eastern trade would be controlled by the French, and France could become a great maritime power. The conquest of Egypt would secure the passage to the Red Sea for France, speeding up French access to India and the Far East. *Leibniz* argued that if *Louis XIV* conquered Egypt he would be the lord of Eastern trade and of the Mediterranean, the Emperor of the East and the mightiest monarch in Christendom. The Ottoman Empire would fall apart. France would get Egypt and the Habsburg Emperor, Hungary, Poland and the limitrophe countries would get the rest. This shows that *Leibniz* made use of crusader traditions to obscure power interests and political rationalisations. True to tradition he placed the confrontation between Christian Europe and the Turk at the centre. At the same time the real political orientation of the plan was quite obvious.

All this was characteristic of the anti-Turkish plans of the second half of the 17th century. They radiated strength, the interest of great powers in conquest and expansion, but all this was presented in the guise of crusader ideals of fighting the Turks. This is also reflected in plans by *Michel Febvre, Louis XIV* and Marquis *d'Argenson* which are discussed below.

In 1682 *Michel Febvre*, a Capuchin friar, called on the faithful to fight the infidel under the leadership of the King of France, the worthiest and most powerful monarch in Europe. At the same time he urged the conversion of the Turks. He outlined a plan for a major Christian campaign against the Turks, carefully avoiding any notion of cooperation amongst the Christian

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une préface et des notes par M. de Hoffmans: T. G. Djuvara, Cent Projets, pp. 220—224; Paul Ritter, Leibniz' Ägyptischer Plan, in: Leibnizarchiv. Abh. der Leibniz-Ges. Hrsg. v. Paul Ritter. I—III, Darmstadt 1930, I, pp. 1—183. H. Gollwitzer, Geschichte, pp. 172—198; idem, Leibniz als weltpolitischer Denker, *Studia Leibnitiana*, Sonderheft 1 (Wiesbaden 1969), pp. 12—37.

[58]) H. Gollwitzer, Geschichte, p. 97.
[59]) Ibidem, p. 173.

rulers that might go beyond synchronisation. In his opinion that might abort the enterprise. Free rein must be given to conquests by European rulers[60]).

The Grand Dessein[61]) of *Louis XIV* of 1685—1687 was guided by similar principles. It set the conquest of Constantinople as its aim. The plan was drafted at the time of the reconquest of Hungary by the armies of the Holy Roman Empire. *Louis*, expecting the speedy advance of the Imperial forces, and the conquest of Turkish territories, planned to take Constantinople, and to counter a triumphant advance of the Emperor's army by extending the area of occupation taking off from there. The objective was to seize the Eastern Empire anticipating the troops of the Holy Roman Emperor.

Marquis *d'Argenson*, later Foreign Minister of *Louis XV* of France, believed that the falling apart of the Ottoman Empire — its territories becoming the prey of other powers — could not be halted[62]). In his view, poor administration had decisively weakened the Ottoman Empire, and its society was beyond repair. The Holy League enjoyed great successes, *Eugène de Savoie* victoriously advanced on Turkish territory, and so did the Czar of Russia. *D'Argenson* emphasised that the Turkish question no longer appeared in the old guise where it was necessary to support the Emperor in defending himself against the Turks. On the contrary, there was a danger that one day the Emperor would conquer the whole of the Ottoman Empire on his own and the balance of power in Europe would be upset.

D'Argenson called his proposal to divide up the Ottoman Empire a genuine crusade which would be pleasing to God. At the same time he rejected the old type of crusade, declaring it to be a chimaera and noxious[63]). He spoke of Christianising the conquered territories. He proposed that the Ottoman Empire be placed under European rulers; it was to be divided in keeping with the rules of the balance of power and of commerce. In essence, he wished to restore the Eastern Empire, with a Greek, a Macedonian and a Constantinopolitan Kingdom, whose territory extended to Asia Minor[64]). He expected that the falling apart of the Ottoman Empire would imply a consolidation of the balance of power, and universal peace would be possible following the settling of the Turkish question. He did not refer to any change of direction in European colonisation; what he did was rather to plan that Europe would take possession of Africa and Asia, using an Ottoman Empire transformed into an arrangement of Christian states as a starting point, going on to the civilising and Christianising of the world as a whole. What

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[60]) T. G. Djuvara, Cent Projets, pp. 225—229.

[61]) M. H. Omont, Projets de prise de Constantinople et de fondation d'un Empire d'Orient sous Louis XIV., *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, No. 2 (1893), pp. 195—246.

[62]) Journal et mémoires de Marquis d'Argenson. Paris 1859, pp. 361—367.

[63]) Ibidem, p. 362.

[64]) Ibidem, p. 336.

this meant in essence was the replacement of the crusader ideology by the expansion of Europe, with the consolidation of the European balance of power as an aim, avoiding if possible competition amongst imperialists.

It was *Rousseau* who finally drew the attention of his contemporaries to the fact that their age was no longer that of barbarian Turkish attacks[65]. But he still excluded the Turks from the alliance of Christian states[66]. And the same *Rousseau* who doubted that moral justice could ever triumph, stressed the wisdom of *Sully's* plan, the fact that *Sully* predicted that European unity could only come about at the price of much trouble, wars and the use of force[67].

V.

Finally, we can conclude that seventeenth century plans, and indeed the political practice itself, demonstrate that although the Ottoman Empire had integrated into the European system of states both politically and economically[68], neither Turkish nor European thinking was able to draw the appropriate consequences. Europe of the Age of Reformation could

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[65]) Extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle de M. l'Abbé de Saint-Pierre. Amsterdam 1756, pp. 11—58, in: The political writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau. Ed. C. E. Vaughan. Oxford 1962, vol. 1, pp. 365—387.

[66]) Ibidem, p. 364.

[67]) J. ter Meulen, Der Gedanke, p. 255.

[68]) On the contacts amongst the Turkish Empire and the European states: Gabriel Noradounghian, Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'empire ottoman. Paris 1897, vol. I (1300—1789); Baron I. Testa, Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane avec les puissance étrangeres. Paris 1864; I. Hudita, Histoire des relations diplomatiques entre la France et la Transylvanie au XVIIe siècle (1835—1863). Paris 1937; N. Barozzi—G. Berchet, Turchia. Velence 1872; Paul Rycaut, Histoire de l'état present de l'Empire Ottoman: Contenant les maximes Politiques des Turcs. Amsterdam 1696; E. Eickhoff, Venedig, Wien und die Osmanen. Umbruch in Südosteuropa 1645–1670. München 1977; Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in Europa. Gotha 1854—1855; H. Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, The classical age, 1300—1600. London 1973; D. M. Vaughan, Europe and the Turk. A pattern of alliances, 1350—1700. Liverpool 1954; Kurt Koehler, Die orientalische Politik Ludwig's XIV., ihr Verhältnis zum Türkenkrieg von 1683. Leipzig 1907; H. A. R. Gibb—Harold Bowen, Islamic society and the West. A study of the impact of western civilisation on moslem culture in Near East. London, New York e.a. 1951; Gerard Tongas, Les relations de la France avec l'empire ottoman durant la première moitié du XVIIe siècle. Toulouse 1942; A. C. Wood, The english Embassy at Constantinople, 1600—1762, *English Historical Review* 40 (1925), pp. 533—561; J. W. Zinkeisen, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in Europa. Hamburg, Gotha 1840—1863.

not tolerate that a non-Christian state should become part of the European body politic. The Ottoman Empire continued to be looked upon as an alien body which threatened Christendom. All this in spite of the fact that Mediaval notions of a Christian universal empire, headed by the Emperor and governed by canon law were no longer viable after the Reformation. The Reformation swept away the ideal of a universal state. By the second half of the 17th century it was replaced by the principle of the balance of power, regulated by the law of nations which was in a constant state of development. International lawyers who argued on the equality of territorially sovereign states nevertheless endeavoured to exclude the Turks wherever possible. *Grotius* himself demanded discrimination in relation to non-Christian states.

The ideal of Christian unity in opposition to the Turks survived as a living tradition into the seventeenth century. Crusader ideals revived when the Turks once again attacked Christian territories in the second half of the seventeenth century. Their import however essentially changed in keeping with changed circumstances. Writings by *Sully, Leibniz*, Abbot *Saint-Pierre* and Marquis *d'Argenson* all bear witness to this. They modestly — or immodestly — used crusader principles to mask real political objectives, that is a policy of conquest and expansion.

As a consequence, we can conclude that in the 17th century European political thinking the crusade against the Turks, and indeed the Turkish question itself, was treated along the lines of the European historical traditions. It served as a conventional framework for the ideas of the political law and for the plans of a new world and European order. In spite of the deep structural and political changes which changed the face of Europe, the spirit of conquest, embodied in the crusades, survived. With respect to the Turks, the emphasis shifted to the possibility of an armed conquest of the Ottoman Empire, and to the fulfilment of the Christian mission in Christianising the Empire, essentially turning it into a European country. However, the Turkish question was finally solved not by the unity of the European states, but by the total impotence of the Ottoman Empire which made European superiority obvious.

The Peace of Karlowitz was the first of many agreements between the Ottoman Empire and European powers allied against it. It implied that the Turkish offensive had come to an end, and that the Ottoman Empire was forced to take up a defensive position. The Sultan agreed to mediation by neutral powers (England and the Netherlands), these however acted for their own benefit. The Turkish leadership legally accepted the loss of what had been integral parts of the Empire. The *Habsburgs* took Hungary and Transylvania but the Turks kept Temesvár and its environs. The Tisza, Save and Duna formed the border between the two empires. Dalmatia, the Morea and important Aegean islands went to Venice but they had to pass back Lepanto to the Turks. Poland took Podolia and the southern Ukraine, and Russia

took Azov and the territory north of the Dniestr. This was the beginning of the end for the Turkish Empire in Europe. The Turks were still strong enough to defeat their enemies one at a time (with the exeption of the Habsburgs) but an alliance of European states was already much more powerful than the Ottoman Empire.

The defeats suffered by the Ottoman host following their failure to take Vienna thus meant a new stage in relations between the Turks and Europe. Europe was on the offensive in full knowledge of the weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire. True, the expulsion of the Turks from much of Europe was accompanied by the customary Papal encouragement but the real driving forces were the national interest of independent states. Indeed, this is what the Holy League owed many of its successes to. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was finally postponed by the War of the Augsburg League, that is, once again by a conflict between the European powers, and it only took place two hundred years later. By then, however, the Ottoman Empire no longer played a role that could be compared to its earlier one. When the Ottoman Empire ceased to be a European power factor the balance of power was upset and a new balance of power took shape. The balance of power that had existed early in the century was changed as a result of the drop-out of the Ottoman Empire into constantly growing relations of domination and subjection. The events of the centuries to come showed the consequences of the upsetting of the balance of power.

As a closing remark we should point at the important role which the crusades, and the idea of a Holy War, played in the history of Europe. That the Church took on the role of the state, and accepted Holy War, is a legacy medieval Christianity left us, the consequences of which reach out to the present and beyond, in East-West relations, and indeed in the European political culture as such. Let us just refer to the conflicts between Islam and European culture that have dragged on and still remain unsolved. What is at the back of it is the refusal to accept what is different or keeping a critical distance from it. On the one hand that was in line with conquering political and economic objectives, and, on the other hand, it led to confrontations that are difficult to overcome and which were aggravated by the stress on the superiority of European culture and the White Man's Burden in the age of colonialism.