

The Role of Vojvodina in Karadjordje's Revolution

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The 1804 Serbian insurgents owed much to the assistance of their kinsmen from Vojvodina. The First Uprising was an event which the Habsburg Serbs predicted and prepared for. They would not fail to come to its aid. Conversely, the momentum of change in *Karadjordje's* twelve *nahijes* could not but prove a stimulus to the first stirrings among the enserfed Serb peasants to the north of the Sava and the Danube. And even when they looked on the insurgents' advances with some apprehension (as did many of the great Serb prelates in Karlovci and elsewhere), Serbs of the Habsburg Monarchy manifested a fundamental unity of nationhood and purpose with revived Serbia.

The history of Vojvodina is the history of constant migrations. The rich alluvial soil of this southeastern corner of the Pannonian basin, crescented by the westward flow of the great rivers and the nethermost hills of the Banat Mountains, attracted settlers from the earliest times. The Romans established their power in Srijem at the end of the Augustan era. Here as in the adjoining regions they encountered Illyrian, Celtic, and Dacian tribes. Imperial legions did not venture

* In the context of the ensuing discussion, the term "Vojvodina" can be justified only by its convenient access. Therefore, "Vojvodina" (lit. principality) as used here is not some precisely defined territory — for example, the equivalent of Habsburg "Serbian Vojvodina" in 1849—1860, of royal Yugoslavia's *okrug* of Vojvodina (Yugoslav portions of the Banat, Bačka [Bácska], and Baranja [Baranya] in 1921—1929), or of postwar Yugoslavia's *autonomna pokrajina* of Vojvodina (Yugoslav portions of the Banat and Bačka, and eastern and central portions of the pre-1918 *županija* of Srijem [Srem]) — although my concept of Vojvodina embraces these lands. Instead, the term is meant to convey the Habsburg territories contiguous to insurrectionary Serbia (north of the Sava and the Danube), regardless of their administrative status. Whether a portion of the Habsburg Military Frontier, or of civilian-governed areas of southern Hungary and Croatia-Slavonia, or of some special administrative unit (for example, the *District* of Velika Kikinda), Vojvodina was principally defined by its common master (the House of Habsburg), by its proximity to Serbia, and by its predominantly South Slav population at the beginning of the nineteenth century. To be sure, there were South Slav communities as far north as Buda and Szentendre (and even in Slovakia), but their compactness diminished the farther one moved from the confluence of the Tisa (Tisza) and the Danube, the heart of Vojvodina as we envision it today. Ultimately, the discussion concentrates on the Serbs of southern Hungary and Slavonia, who alone among the South Slavs in these areas played an important role in Karadjordje's revolution.

beyond the Danube (*inter arctos maximus Ister aquas*) except for their century and a half in Dacia (contemporary southern Bačka, the Banat, and most of the lands on the right bank of the Olt), which *Aurelian* abandoned in 274. But from Sirmium (today's Mitrovica), in the heart of Srijem, the Romans ruled for half a millennium. This was one of the great centers of the Empire, fully acculturated and Romanized. *Decius*, the first great persecutor of the Church, *Aurelian* (*restitutor orbis*), and *Probus*, *Maximian*, and *Constantius II*, were all born in Srijem. A vital center of Christianity, Srijem was also the birthplace of *St. Demetrius* (the tutelary deacon-martyr of *Civitas Sancti Demetrii*, Dimitrovci, or Mitrovica) and of *St. Anastasia*.

German barbarians (Asding Vandals, Gepids, and Goths) menaced the Danubian frontier of Rome from the beginning of the third century. In the fifth century, under the pressure of the awe-inspiring Huns, Germanic penetration of the Empire turned into the stampeding *Völkerwanderung*. With the rise of the Huns, Rome (and its Byzantine successor) never quite regained the Pannonian plain. There, nomad states followed one another in rapid sequence (Huns, Avars, Bulgars, and in the tenth century, Magyars), while throughout the dominant ethnic substratum increasingly assumed Slavic contours.

Slavic settlement of the Pannonian basin and the Balkans was at its height during the mid-seventh century Avar-dominated drive. Nevertheless, neither this mass advent of "undifferentiated" Slavs nor the subsequent coming of the Croats and Serbs (during the reign of the Byzantine Emperor *Heraclius*, 610—641) altered Vojvodina's relative political insignificance. Though the Slavs had predominated here since the times of the Avar Khāqanāte, their social organization on the whole retained a tribal form: Vojvodina was a part of the Pannonian *Slovinje* (= *sclavinia*; i. e. a tribal Slavic area), a name which has survived through Hungarian phonetic transmutations in the Croat regional toponym "Slavonia." The continuance of the common Slavic name is an indication that the *staatsbildenden* Croats and Serbs did not succeed in assimilating Vojvodina's "undifferentiated" Slavs within their national and state traditions. Indeed, no South Slavic medieval state ever mastered Vojvodina. And though the Hungarians ruled it as early as the reign of *St. Stephen* (c. 974—1038) and then colonized and largely Magyarized it beginning with the reign of *Béla III* (1148—1196), the fertile Tisa plain remained the most agrarian, and the most rustic, Hungarian region and the one least amenable to the wishes of the throne. The verse of Janus Pannonius (1434—1472) about his native Slavonia, applied just as accurately to Vojvodina: "[This land], *Pagos complures, oppida nulla gerit*"¹⁾.

¹⁾ Ivan Česmički (Janus Pannonius), *Pjesme i epigrami*. Zagreb: JAZU, 1951, p. 194. Literature on the history of Vojvodina is relatively plentiful. Several general histories of the Serbs in Vojvodina are available but should be used with considerable caution. See especially Dušan J. Popović, *Srbi u Vojvodini*. 3 vols., Novi Sad: Matica srpska, 1957—1963. On the pre-1690 developments see the following extremely useful collection of articles: Dušan J. Popović, ed., *Vojvodina: I. Od najstarijih vremena do Velike seobe*. Novi Sad: Istorisko društvo, 1939.

The rapid expansion of the Ottoman Turks in southeastern Europe opened a new chapter in the history of Slavic settlement in Vojvodina. After the Serbian disaster at the field of Kosovo (1389), *Stefan Lazarević*, the most important of the surviving Serbian princes, became an Ottoman vassal. Emboldened by the Ottoman reversals in the east (Ankara, 1402), *Stefan* pledged fealty to *Sigismund I* of Hungary without abrogating Serbia's Ottoman ties. As the new Serbian *despot* (*δεσπότης* — a title *Stefan* acquired in Constantinople signifying, since the time of the Comneni, authority second only to that of the Byzantine emperors) and as the most important vassal of the Hungarian crown, *Stefan Lazarević* acquired extensive Hungarian possessions, including Mačva (Macsó), Belgrade (with *Stefan* for the first time the capital of Serbia), and portions of the Szatmár county in north-eastern Hungary. In exchange, the revitalized Serbian Despotate of *Stefan* and his immediate successors became a buffer between Hungary and the Turks.

A new upsurge in Ottoman expansion under *Mehmet II (Fatih)* put an end to the dual dependancy of the Serbian Despots. With the fall of Smederevo (1459), the Turks occupied the Despotate's last holding in Serbia proper, directly opposite the Hungarians on the other side of the Danube. During the reign of *Süleyman I* (1520—1566), the greatest of their line, the Ottomans conquered almost all the lands of the Hungarian crown (including Vojvodina) and ruled them either with intermediaries or directly for the next century and a half. But in a thin strip of land from the Tatras to the Adriatic, the only unconquered territory of the old kingdom, the Hungarian and Croat estates turned to the Habsburgs and brought them to their respective thrones. The much desired reconquest of the Ottoman-held lands was thus entrusted to the most powerful European dynasty, a strategy that had many advantages but almost an equal number of perils. As early as 1578 the Habsburg military command set out to refashion the Military Frontier, a defensive cordon in Croatia-Slavonia, which was to be garrisoned by free peasant-soldiers, largely refugees from the Balkan hinterland, among them many Serbs.

The sixteenth-century migrations of the Serbs were motivated by many factors. The nobility's decision to leave for Vojvodina was facilitated by the close ties between the despots and the Hungarian crown. Along with the nobles (and the Branković successors of *Stefan Lazarević*) came thousands of dependent Serb peasants. Still others fled from the devastation left in the wake of Ottoman raids. *Rácz*, the name that the migrants received from the Hungarians, is evidence that the Serbs of Hungary came from the Balkan interior. (The term stems from *Rasciani*, a medieval Latin name for the inhabitants of Raška, a Serbian heartland in the valley of Ibar²).

With the resettlement in Hungary, the status of the Serbs became a political issue. The newcomers did not inhabit a separate territory, yet their military stature was valued and they were thus largely exempted from the authority of the Hungarian nobility. The kings of Hungary appointed the despots and thereby

²) Petar Skok, *Toponomastika Vojvodine*, in: Popović, ed., *Vojvodina*, pp. 110—111.

implicitly recognized the unique position of their Serb subjects. (The practice became an idle exercise with the Ottoman expansion into Hungary and was abandoned after the death of Despot *Pavle Bakić* in 1537). The Hungarian nobility and the Catholic Church, however, never quite accepted the privileged status of the Serbs and their immunity from the feudal dues and especially from the payment of the tithes.

The struggle for Serb territorial autonomy assumed a particularly dramatic form under the leadership of the mysterious *Jovan Nenada* (d. 1527), the thaumaturge “Czar of the Serbs,” who set out to extinguish *Muhammad’s* faith. But under the firm Ottoman rule in central Hungary, the Serbs enjoyed considerably greater autonomy than was possible in the non-Muslim Hungarian crownlands. Moreover, the Serbs were increasingly coming to terms with the reality of Ottoman overlordship. Slow accommodation gave way to a fairly successful partnership which received an institutional framework with the revival of the autocephalous Patriarchate of Peć (Ipek). Authorized by the Porte in 1557, the Patriarchate embraced an enormous territory from Slovakia in the north to the Adriatic littoral (from Senj to the mouth of the Drin) in the south. Ottoman-held Serbia, Montenegro, Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, were all within its frontiers. Its jurisdiction also extended over a wedge-shaped portion of western Bulgaria, as well as over the last non-Ottoman remnants of Croatia.

As ethnarchs of the Serbs, the Patriarchs of Peć had not only all the prerogatives of their spiritual station but also the authority that belonged to the crowned heads of medieval Serbian states. In transactions with the Porte, they were the sole representatives of the Eastern Orthodox faithful under their jurisdiction, and these were by no means all Serbs. Similarly, the Patriarchate obtained a significant amount of judicial power within the Orthodox community. And it was largely due to the influence of the Church that consciousness of Serbian state and national traditions not only survived but was even extended to communities where it had never before existed. The maintenance of learning was also a responsibility of the Church. In short, though captive, the Serbs thrived in a veritable gilded cage. They did well for as long as they accepted their subjected — although entirely autonomous — status within a heterodox Islamic empire. New waves of Serb migrants entered Vojvodina during the Ottoman period. They increasingly included state retainers, members of Christian units in the Ottoman army (*ἀρχματολοὶ*), or merchants who pursued new trade routes opened by the Ottoman conquest. Croat Catholic migrations to Vojvodina (from Dalmatia [*Bunjevci*] and Bosnia [*Šokci*]) also occurred during the Turkish period.

Throughout the seventeenth century the Ottoman state steadily declined. Internal decay hastened the loss of holdings in the Danubian area. After *Kara Mustafa’s* unsuccessful attempt to seize Vienna (1683), *Leopold I* altered the course of Ottoman retreat into a victorious reconquest of Hungary and Croatia-Slavonia. By 1689, Habsburg armies had penetrated the Ottoman Balkans as far south as Veles and Štip in Macedonia. Their advance was accompanied by popular uprisings against the Turks supported in part by the Serbian church. The slowdown

and withdrawal of the Habsburg forces in 1690 signaled the flight of insurgent Serbs, who were obliged to run away or face Ottoman retribution. Led by Patriarch *Arsenije III Čarnojević*, most of the inhabitants of Kosovo and Macedonia migrated northward and eventually crossed into Bačka and other areas of newly liberated Hungary, completing the "Great Migration" of the Serbs.

Armed Habsburg contention with the Turks continued intermittently for yet another fifty years. During twenty of those years (1718—1739), the Habsburgs were in actual control of portions of northern Bosnia and much of the northern Serbia. But with the Peace of Belgrade (1739), the Habsburg-Ottoman frontier was set at the Sava and the Danube, separating the Serbs of Vojvodina from their ravaged ancestral lands to the south. The continuance of the boundary line compelled a rearrangement of Serb privileges in the Monarchy. When *Arsenije III* led the Serbs into Hungary he naturally expected a confirmation of the same status which the Patriarchs of Peć enjoyed under the Turks. Most Serbs lived in the Military Frontier (extended after the reconquest into Vojvodina and Transylvania), an area cut off from the Hungarian and Croat estates and under exclusive imperial administration. As a martial people, the Serbs counted on Habsburg goodwill. Leopoldine privileges affirmed *Arsenije III's* spiritual and secular primacy over his flock. But though the status of *patrimonium domus Austriacae* shielded the Serbs from the Hungarian claims, it could not protect them from Vienna's long-range tendency to circumscribe Serb autonomy³).

To be sure, whenever war with the Turks seemed imminent or, for example, during Rákóczi's Hungarian war of independence (МАЖАРСКА РЕБЕЛИЈА, 1703—1711), the throne would reaffirm Serb privileges. In peacetime, however, the Habsburgs repeatedly demonstrated insensitivity to Serb aspirations. *Maria Theresia's* abolition of the Tisa-Maros Military Frontier (1749) resulted in Serb migrations to Russia. The throne was also determined to reduce the secular prerogatives of *Arsenije III's* successors. (Serbian Orthodox hierarchs in the Habsburg lands became *de facto* autocephalous in 1737—1748. Ranked as Metropolitans, they shepherded their flock from Karlovci [Carlowitz], the "Serbian Zion" in Srijem.) Nevertheless, Serb church assemblies (*sabori*), which were usually convened to elect new church Metropolitans, became a parliamentary forum for the airing of Serb political grievances. The assemblies deliberated on all issues of common interest, from ecclesiastical administration to questions of property, and education. They were "the most important foundation of autonomy of the Serbs in Hungary and the most valuable people's achievement"⁴).

³) On the efforts of the Serbs to achieve full autonomy in Vojvodina see Jovan Savković, *Borba Srba Vojvodjana za svoju teritorijalnu i političku samostalnost*, *Zbornik Matice srpske: Serija društvenih nauka*, Novi Sad, 1952, 3, pp. 21—51; idem, *Borba Srba Vojvodjana za svoju narodno-crkvenu autonomiju*, *Zbornik Matice srpske: Serija društvenih nauka*, 1952, 4, pp. 5—23; Jovan Radonić and Mita Kostić, *Srpske privilegije od 1690 do 1792*. Belgrade: SANU, 1954.

⁴) *Historija naroda Jugoslavije*. Vol. 2, Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1959, p. 1129.

Real limitations in Vienna's policies toward the Serbs need not obscure the fact that the Hungarian nobles were far more consistent opponents of the Serbs privileges. The throne — in its own interests — usually resisted the anti-Serb sentiments of the Hungarian nobility. The Hungarians viewed the status of the Serbs (and indeed the institution of the Military Frontier) as an illegal check on Hungary's parliamentary prerogatives. In its contention with Habsburg absolutism, the Pozsony Diet wanted to establish regular civil administration throughout Hungary and to revive the counties (*vármegye* or *županije*). To the Serbs this meant Hungarian domination and more than likely enserfment, a practice to which the Serbs were increasingly exposed in violation of their free status. Vienna could only profit from the feelings that developed between the Hungarians and the Serb "intruders":

Magyaren und Rázen
Hunde und Katzen
Rácz und Magyar
Zank das ganze Jahr⁵).

It is a curious paradox that the growing economic and cultural achievements of the Habsburg Serbs did not improve their political standing in relation to the court or the *vármegye* authorities. Serbian society in Vojvodina was undergoing a thorough *embourgeoisement* throughout the eighteenth century. The flowering of crafts in the newly created "free and royal" cities, the growth of commercial capital, and the spread of enlightenment culture, especially during the reign of *Joseph II*, transformed the life of the Serb community. Education and the arts were increasingly secular, less oriented toward Russia and more open to the European West. Rich merchants were taking the lead in public life at the expense of the churchmen. The widespread appeal of historical works (biographies of Serbian kings and other notables, and chronicles) was a manifestation of steady growth in national consciousness. Not surprisingly, the Temesvár Assembly (1790) repeated the demands for a separate Serb territory to be administered by a special magistrate — a *vojvoda*.

The Temesvár demands were instigated by the court as a counterweight to Hungarian pressures which arose in the aftermath of Josephinist centralization. But Temesvár was promptly forgotten as soon as the Hungarians moderated their attitude. Nevertheless, in the age dominated by the revolutionary events in France, political aspirations could not easily be diverted. The war that the Monarchy waged against the Turks (1787—1791) rekindled insurgent fires in Serbia. The elite of the Serbs in Vojvodina was again made conscious that the Ottoman regime was both an anachronism and an anomaly. But even after the disappointing results of the war, Serbian *raya* could not be completely pacified — nor would the Vojvodina Serbs permit it. *Dositej Obradović* and *Sava Tekelija*, two prominent thinkers from Vojvodina, both planned to journey to Serbia in 1798 "to see what

⁵) Cited in Dušan J. Popović, *Vojvodina: Prilozi proučavanju naše zemlje i našega naroda: Opšti deo: I. Bačka*. Belgrade: SKA, 1925, p. 41.

could be done with those people”⁶). They clearly believed that the growth of Serb freedom in Vojvodina also depended on the developments south of the Sava and the Danube.

The excitement engendered by the news of the uprising in Serbia very quickly spread throughout the Serb diaspora. *Karadjordje's* movement won sympathy everywhere. Moreover, people sensed that this insurrection was different from the many outbreaks of the past. Requests for grain and arms suggested the initial form of assistance which the Serbs of Vojvodina extended to the insurgents⁷). Thus, despite Habsburg prohibitions, arming and provisioning of the revolution largely depended on the ingenuity of Serb merchants from Vojvodina.

Pressed by the French and fearful of Russia's intentions in the Balkans, Vienna sought to maintain a strict neutrality in the Serbian conflagration. In May 1804, Emperor *Franz* prohibited the export of grain to Serbia. Import of cattle was also stopped. The Serbs, for a number of reasons, almost completely disregarded these edicts. Most importantly, there was a continuing demand for grain by the combatants, especially by the beleaguered Turks in Belgrade and other cities, whose provisioning during the initial years of the uprising was in certain ways worse than that of the insurgents, and much profit was to be gained by such sales. There was also the enthusiasm of the patriotic sentiments that accompanied transactions with the insurgents⁸). The Vojvodina merchants, like merchants in other parts of the Balkans, were losing much as a result of the massive disruption in international commerce between the Middle East and Central Europe resulting from the revolution, and they were hardly likely to be put off by official edicts. At times, also, political expediency, reasons of prestige, and insurgent and Turkish pressures forced an easing of prohibitions. Thus the Vojvodina trade with Serbia did not slacken during the revolution. In any event, merchants and frontiersmen soon found ways to circumvent the authorities and smuggle provisions to Serbia, and since they also continued, in the same way, to import livestock from Serbia, they established a trade which supplied the insurgents with funds that were then used to buy more supplies to keep the revolt going.

The Habsburg authorities were considerably more efficient in stemming the export of arms to *Karadjordje's* men than they were in enforcing the bans on grain and cattle, but even in this, in the early years of the uprising, contraband flourished. The Serbs were in desperate need of matériel — Metropolitan *Stefan*

⁶) Cited in Dušan J. Popović, *Sava Tekelija prema Prvom srpskom ustanku*, *Zbornik Matice srpske: Serija društvenih nauka*, 1954, 7, p. 121.

⁷) On this matter and on the whole subject of relations between Vojvodina and insurgent Serbia see the masterful work of Slavko Gavrilović, *Vojvodina i Srbija u vreme Prvog ustanka*. Novi Sad: Institut za izučavanje istorije Vojvodine, 1974; on the grain and arms trade during the early stages of the uprising see especially pp. 40—61. See also Slavko Benović, *Sremski trgovci i Prvi srpski ustanak do 1809 godine*, *Zbornik Matice srpske: Serija društvenih nauka*, 1953, 5, pp. 5—25.

⁸) Cf. Gavrilović, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

Stratimirović estimated that at the beginning of the revolution the relative strength of the Serb arsenal in comparison with that of the Turks was three to one thousand — and *Karadjordje* was unsuccessful in all his requests for military aid from the Monarchy⁹). The insurgents therefore resorted to illegal imports from Vojvodina, an arrangement which the merchants found extremely lucrative. (*Prota Matija Nenadović*, for example, purchased a hamper of cartridge cases and three hundred bullets from *Stefan Živković-Nišlija*, a merchant of Zemun, in February 1804, and was not sorry that in the subsequent transaction *Živković* exacted a profit of 130 percent¹⁰).

Even before the beginning of the hostilities, *Karadjordje* foresaw the need to establish channels for illicit trade. In August 1803 he entered into a secret compact with *Dragutin Milutinović*, a Zemun merchant, who agreed to arm the Serbs should the need arise¹¹). Together with *Miloš Urošević*, the chief insurgent arms dealer (also of Zemun), *Milutinović* supplied the rebel units in central Serbia, and *Dimitrije Puljević* of Mitrovica supplied the Brankovina *Nenadovića*s and *Pop Luka Lazarević*, all active in the Valjevo area of western Serbia. Several other Zemun merchants (among them *Dimitrije Ratković* and the afore-mentioned *Živković-Nišlija*), as well as *Lazar Popović* of Orsova, completed the roster of the revolution's principal suppliers¹²). Most of these merchants also furnished the Serbs with grain and other provisions.

The extent of gunrunning to Serbia can only be guessed at. All indications point to a farflung and complicated supply system. Rifles and carbines were purchased in Hungary, Croatia, and Carniola, cannons in Srijem, the Banat, Moldavia, and Styria, and in the late spring of 1804 *Živković-Nišlija* "had sixty Jews working for him in Zemun who secretly filled cartridges" for the rebels¹³). The Habsburg authorities preferred to overlook small-scale smuggling, and individual military commanders even authorized sales of gunpowder and lead to known Serbian dealers¹⁴). Nevertheless, many Srijem merchants participated in illicit trade only as investors, leaving the actual arrangements to the daring few, who frequently lost all sense of proportion.

The activities of *Dimitrije Puljević* were an example of how sophisticated the smuggling of matériel sometimes was. *Puljević*, the owner of a barge-transport company in Mitrovica, established a trading partnership which functioned as a joint-stock bank and an export firm. Subscribed capital invested by *Puljević* and his partners amounted to 40,000 *Groschen* and was lent only to those borrowers who could provide collateral security in land. Another branch of the company

⁹) Aleksa Ivić, ed., *Spisi bečkih arhiva o Prvom srpskom ustanku: Knjiga treća — godina 1806*. Subotica: Srpska Kraljevska Akademija, 1937, p. 416.

¹⁰) *The Memoirs of Prota Matija Nenadović*, ed. and trans. by Lovett F. Edwards. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 57—58, 71—73.

¹¹) Gavrilović, op. cit., p. 54.

¹²) Benović, op. cit., pp. 9, 12.

¹³) *The Memoirs of...Nenadović*, p. 88.

¹⁴) Ivić, ed., op. cit., Knjiga IX — godina 1811. Belgrade: SANU, 1971, p. 107.

(an investment of several of *Karadjordje's vojvode*) specialized in the export of livestock to the Monarchy. *Puljević's* principal purpose, however, was to generate funds for the purchase of arms and ammunition. His barges transported cattle from Serbia and returned with illicit weapons. Remittances for the contraband were "washed" in the barge firm¹⁵). This practice was later emulated by *Živković-Nišlija*.

The acquiring of cannons also showed a flagrant disregard for the regulations. Vojvodina Serbs were engaged in the supplying of cannons as early as March 1804 when *Jovan Jovanović*, the bishop of Novi Sad, secretly sent the first of his cathedral's two cannons (together with a cannoner) to *Jakov Nenadović*¹⁶). Accounts vary on the number of cannons in insurgent hands and the number acquired from the Monarchy. *Karadjordje* probably did not have 126 cannons (as one Austrian account says), but he certainly had a great many. Moreover, even his legendary cherry tree cannons had Vojvodina associations. This curious artillery was fashioned by *Jovan Petrović*, a blacksmith from Zemun¹⁷). And *Jovan Bota* ("ot Botta"), a German bellsmith from Vršac, manufactured the first cannons produced in insurgent Serbia¹⁸).

The presence of trained personnel in rebel ranks was decisive for the course of the revolution. *Karadjordje* and his *vojvode* needed officers and other military specialists. Technicians and craftsmen, scribes and teachers, and workers of all types were also in great demand. Vojvodina's aid to insurgent Serbia, therefore, can best be measured in terms of experienced manpower. The desertion of Serb hussars and frontiersmen and the flight of Serb civilians from the Monarchy to Serbia assumed serious proportions in 1807 after the defeat of the Srijem rebellion. But even before this event (which will be analyzed below), the presence of the Vojvodina Serbs was noticeable among the insurgents¹⁹). No conclusive evidence exists on the exact number of civilian émigrés. As for the officers and soldiers who quit the frontier service, Habsburg intelligence estimated that 515 military personnel (327 frontiersmen and 188 soldiers from the regular regimental units) deserted to Serbia in 1807 alone²⁰). This could not fail to alarm the Habsburg authorities, who invoked severe measures against ferrymen and others who aided the fugitives in their escape to Serbia.

¹⁵) Miodrag Kolarić, Dimitrije Puljević, trgovac iz Sremske Mitrovice i snabdevač za vreme Prvog ustanka, *Zbornik Matice srpske: Serija društvenih nauka*, 1954, 7, pp. 169—174.

¹⁶) The Memoirs of ... Nenadović, pp. 72—73.

¹⁷) Miodrag Kolarić, Ko je bio prvi Karadjordjev topolivac, *Zbornik Matice srpske: Serija društvenih nauka*, 1954, 7, p. 178.

¹⁸) Ibidem, pp. 178—179.

¹⁹) Gavrilović, op. cit., pp. 254—304. See also the same author's earlier study of refugees to Serbia: Austrija i pitanje vojvodjanskih desertera i prebega u vreme Prvog srpskog ustanka, *Zbornik Matice srpske: Serija društvenih nauka*, 1954, 7, pp. 106—117.

²⁰) Ivić, ed., op. cit., Knjiga peta — godina 1808. Subotica: Srpska Kraljevska Akademija, 1939, p. 226.

This flight of Habsburg subjects to Serbia traditionally has been attributed to patriotic stimuli. Recent writings (especially the authoritative social studies of Slavko Gavrilović) suggest that other — sometimes base — motives should not be overlooked. Frontiersmen deserted to free themselves from the rigors of discipline and from the tutelage of their extended families; others, notably Home Guards from Zemun, left so as to avoid being forced into the fight against *Napoleon*; the majority were poor and hoped for a new chance in *Karadjordje's* service. Returnees only recently out of Serbia, craftsmen and apprentices, disgruntled monks and fallen women, *Exercirmeister* and enserfed peasants looking for free land, Zemun and Pančevo fishermen in search of better catch, and fugitives from the law — all sought refuge in Serbia. Their ranks included the famous and the obscure — from the great *Dositej Obradović* to *Nićifor Ninković* from Dobrinci near Ruma, who later became Prince *Miloš's liceukrasitelj* (face-embellisher, or, more prosaically, barber) and wrote a chronicle that became famous. The insurgent leaders did all they could to encourage immigration, and the seriousness of their needs for manpower can be deduced from the fact that no amount of Habsburg pressure succeeded in effecting the extradition of the wanted refugees.

Only a handful of immigrants (and then mainly the educated ones) acquired any great prominence during the course of the revolution. The contributions of some of these individuals, however, is so paramount that it merits special attention. Most of the notable émigrés were natives of Vojvodina, while others, for example the mentioned *Živković-Nišlija*, who ultimately settled in Serbia, and *Petar Novaković-Čardaklija*, a Habsburg officer who became one of *Karadjordje's vojvode*, although born in Serbia spent most of their lives in the Habsburg Monarchy.

Živković's formidable career as one of the revolution's principal forwarding agents was followed by other services to the Serbian cause. This "Serbian Ulysses", as *Isidor Stojanović* called him, was also active in diplomatic missions. He helped in *Prota Matija's* delegation to Russia and subsequently participated in the 1805 mission to Istanbul²¹). *Čardaklija*, a retired officer who had spent several years in Russia, was the most ardent Russophile of all the insurgent leaders and the one most active in urging *Karadjordje* to request Russian protection. An intermediary between *Karadjordje* and *K. K. Rodofinikin*, he helped to ease the tension aroused by the Russian representative's tactless behavior.

One of the most important figures in the revolution was *Teodor Filipović* (in Serbia known as *Božo Grujović*). He had been educated in Lutheran schools in Hungary and had a degree in law from the University of Pest, and like *Čardaklija*, had lived in Russia, where he taught history of law at Kharkov University²²). After joining *Prota Matija's* mission in Russia, he went to Serbia in 1805 where he soon became a one-man chancellery, one of the moving spirits behind the establishment of the *Praviteljstvujušči Sovjet* (State Council), and the first secretary of this

²¹) Milovan Ristić, Stefan Živković-Nišlija. Belgrade: Prosveta, 1956, passim.

²²) Idem, Ustanički zakonopisac Teodor Filipović (Božidar Grujović), Belgrade: Prosveta, 1957, passim.

nascent organ of Serbia's civil administration. In *Grujović's* conception, the *Sovjet* was supposed to be the highest state authority, invested with the supreme legislative, judicial, and administrative responsibilities. It should be noted that *Svetozar Marković* attributed the structure of the *Sovjet* to the Hungarian *vármege* organization, which was characterized by the division of the administrative and judicial responsibilities among the elected officials. If this is true, the inspiration came from Vojvodina and was probably transmitted by *Grujović*, "the second doctor of law in his nation", a person very familiar with the Hungarian practices, who was moreover determined to further the acceptance of strict legality and constitutionalism in the young state. In this endeavor, *Grujović* was only partly successful. His work was cut short by his illness and premature death in 1807 at the age of thirty-two.

Several other Vojvodina Serbs distinguished themselves in *Karadjordje's* state apparatus and in the fledgling *Velika škola* (Great School), the first lycée in Serbia. Prominent among them were *Radič Petrović*, a former *Freikorps* captain who became an insurgent *vojvoda*; *Mihailo Filipović-Grujović*, *Božo Grujović's* younger brother and a secretary of *Karadjordje's* 1811 *Sovjet*; *Stefan Živković-Telemak*, *Stevan Filipović* of Ruma, and *Jeremija Gagić*, all *Sovjet* secretaries; *Miljko Radonjić*, *Karadjordje's* first *popečitelj* (minister) of foreign affairs; *Lazar Vojnović*, a professor at the *Velika škola*; and *Ivan Savić-Jugović*, a learned Hungarian-trained lawyer, who became a *Sovjet* secretary, helped found the *Velika škola*, served as a minister of education, and between these duties tutored young *Vuk Stefanović Karadžić*, the future Serbian language reformer²³). More will be said about *Dositej Obradović*, the greatest of the émigré notables. Some of them university-trained, they all proved indispensable for the tasks that confronted the insurgent administration.

As natives or longtime residents in the Habsburg Monarchy, most of the émigré notables harbored suspicions about the sincerity of Vienna's policies during the course of the uprising. Many were quite openly Russophile, counting on the active aid of the great Slavic and Eastern Orthodox empire to make up for the tepid Habsburg support. The Habsburg authorities tended to blame the Monarchy's diplomatic adversities in Serbia on the nefarious influence of the Vojvodina

²³) *Radonjić*, *Savić-Jugović*, and *Vojnović* were associated with the famous Karlovci gymnasium, the first as a professor (1798—1802), the others as graduates. On these and other Karlovci students who later taught at Belgrade's *Velika škola* see K[osta] P[etrović], *Ispisi iz gimnaziskog arhiva stare karlovačke gimnazije o profesorima Velike škole u Karadjordjevoj Srbiji*, *Zbornik Matice srpske: Serija društvenih nauka*, 1954, 7, pp. 195—198. See also three articles by Milovan Ristić: *Mihailo Filipović-Grujović, sekretar Sovjeta za vreme Karadjordja i predsednik suda za vreme kneza Miloša*, *Istoriski glasnik* (Belgrade), 1954, 3, pp. 53—72; *Stefan Živković-Telemak, političar i književnik obnovljene Srbije, 1780—1831*, *ibidem*, 1955, 1, pp. 57—70; and *Vojvodjani u revoluciji: Mihailo-Miljko Radonjić*, *ibidem*, 1954, 1—2, pp. 239—253. On *Savić-Jugović* see *Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, Gradja za srpsku istoriju našega vremena i životi najpoznatijih poglavica ovoga vremena*. Belgrade: Štamparija Kraljevine Srbije, 1898, pp. 268—282.

émigrés. Nevertheless, a small but vocal group among the émigrés actually espoused reliance on Vienna. *Savić-Jugović*, *Mihailo Filipović-Grujović*, and *Rado-njić* were prominent among these *nemčkari* (Germanophiles), and *Savić-Jugović* was not only the leader of the pro-Habsburg party, but, moreover, an Austrian confidant.

Lack of patriotism does not explain why foreign patronage was so sedulously courted. Rather, the Serbs were understandably mistrustful of their own native strength. *Stefan Stratimirović*, the Metropolitan of Karlovci, knew all the Serb weaknesses better than any of his contemporaries. This aristocratic prelate and legal scholar, a member of the *Stratimirović* gentry of Kulpin in Bačka, did not hesitate to point out that the Ottoman Serbs were "entirely uncultivated", and that despite the insurgents' bravery and wits, they needed much help and guidance²⁴). But unlike the insurgent leaders who knew nothing of Russia but vividly remembered the anti-Ottoman struggles they had fought under the Habsburg standards, *Stratimirović* was convinced that although tolerance should be sought from the Porte, and aid from Vienna, salvation could come only from Russia. This is especially significant since, apart from a few émigré notables who frequently acted in concert with the Metropolitan (for example, *Božo Grujović*, who received his pseudonym from *Stratimirović*, and *Dositej Obradović*), no single Serb from Vojvodina contributed more to the initial successes of the revolution than this Serb ethnarch of Karlovci.

Stratimirović's election to the metropolitan see of Karlovci in 1790 was more a result of the electors' relentlessness than of Vienna's choice. But while *Stratimirović* formally maintained all the traditional ties that bound the Serbs to the Habsburg court, his heart of hearts was denied to Vienna. When the uprising began, Serbian leaders naturally turned first to *Stratimirović*, who for his part did much to dispose the Austrian officialdom in favor of the insurrection, even though he believed that *Karadjordje's* success could be lasting only if Russia came to the insurgents' aid. As the person who actually directed the rebels' foreign ties during the early stages of the revolution (according to a Karlovci oral tradition, on several occasions *Karadjordje* himself secretly crossed into Srijem in order to confer with the Metropolitan), *Stratimirović* sought to win the support of *Alexander I* for a plan that called for the building of a "new Slavo-Serb state", to be headed by a Russian or a Lutheran prince (but not a Habsburg!), and to consist not only of former Ottoman possessions but also of Habsburg lands, including parts of Vojvodina²⁵).

²⁴) Stevan Stratimirović, *Ličnosti u Prvom ustanku od 1804 godine*, *Srpski književni glasnik*, Belgrade, 19 (1907), no. 5, p. 355.

²⁵) On *Stratimirović's* memorandum to the Russians and on the other similar proposals see Gavrilović, *Vojvodina...*, pp. 20—24. See also I.S. Dostian, *Plany osnovaniia slaviano-serbskogo gosudarstva s pomošč'iu Rossii v načale XIX v.*, in: *Slaviane i Rossiia*, ed. Iu. V. Bromlei et al., Moscow: Nauka, 1972, pp. 98—107. On *Stratimirović's* activities, especially with reference to the Serbian revolution, see: Gavrilović, *Vojvodina...*, pp. 14—39; Nikola Radojčić, *Mitropolit Stefan*

Stratimirović's memorandum was secretly delivered to the desk of Prince *Adam Czartoryski* in June 1804, but *Alexander's* Polish minister never transmitted it to the tsar. (One fanciful Vojvodina tale would have it that the memorandum ultimately fell into Austrian hands but was suppressed to avoid embarrassment and/or the alerting of the Metropolitan, who was already regarded as a "cunning Oriental." The intercepted letter was supposed to have graced the desk of the Habsburg rulers as a constant reminder about the actual state of Serb loyalty)²⁶).

Despite the traditions of Catherine's "Greek Project", the beleaguered St. Petersburg diplomats rejected other plans for Serbian statehood under the aegis of Russia, schemes which were even more elaborate than *Stratimirović's* and equally impossible during the age of *Bonaparte*. For example, they did not seriously consider the petition (*Chelobitnaia*) for the creation of a Serbo-Bulgarian state, which was advanced in October 1804 by *Jovan Jovanović*, the Serb bishop of Novi Sad. *Jovanović's* state also included the Danubian Principalities, Bosnia, and all the other Ottoman holdings in the Balkans. His petition much resembled an even more complicated plan thought up by *Sofronije Jugović-Marković*, a Vojvodina Serb in Russian service. This called for a Serbian protectorate (akin to Georgia's status in Imperial Russia) which also would have embraced all the Habsburg South Slav possessions as far west as Istria within the social order modeled on Russia's service state. Both plans envisioned a monarchy headed by Grand Duke *Konstantin Pavlovich*, whom *Jovanović* wanted to crown as the "Serbian and Bulgarian Tsar Konstantin Nemanich", after the medieval Serbian Nemanjić dynasty²⁷). But though nothing came of the Vojvodina plans for Russian-sponsored Serbian statehood, *Stratimirović* and the other Serb notables from Vojvodina in a sense imposed the aim of national independence on a peasant insurrection, which originally had only the perspective of assuring Sultanic favor against the depredations (*zülum*) of the *dayıs* and the other "bad Turks".

Stratimirović, *Letopis Matice srpske*, Novi Sad, January-February, 1939, pp. 40—60; *Dimitrije Ruvarac*, *Mitropolit Stevan Stratimirović*, *Glasnik Istoriskog društva u Novom Sadu*, 4 (1931), pp. 374—391.

²⁶) *Nikola Radojčić*, *Lukijan Mušicki u Praviteljstvujuščem sovjetu serbskom*, *Zbornik Matice srpske: Serija društvenih nauka*, 1954, 7, p. 162.

²⁷) It should be noted that at least one Vojvodina plan for Serbian statehood did not take Russia into account: *Sava Tekelija* (1761—1842), the learned Serb jurist of noble birth and formidable wealth, in 1803 approached the French legation in Vienna with a plea that *Bonaparte* should fashion the South Slav areas conquered by the French into an "Illyrian" (i.e. South Slav) state, which would then aid the liberation of Ottoman Serbs. And in 1805, *Tekelija* sent a memorandum to *Franz I* warning him that the House of Habsburg must aspire to become the head of all the Germans, and should abandon the South Slavs to Serbia and sell Dalmatia and the Bay of Kotor to Serbia and help her in acquiring Bosnia, Albania, and Bulgaria. The influence of Russia in the Balkans would thereby be stopped. Unless the Habsburgs started espousing the national idea, argued *Tekelija*, the dissolution of their Monarchy would become imminent. See *Dušan J. Popović*, *Sava Tekelija prema Prvom srpskom ustanku*, *Zbornik Matice srpske: Serija društvenih nauka*, 1954, 7, pp. 122—123.

Stratimirović's solicitude for the insurgents' cause manifested itself in his constant advice to the leaders of the revolution. It was *Stratimirović* who directed *Božo Grujović* to Serbia, and it was he who in August 1805 sent a letter to *Jakov Nenadović*, *Prota Matija*, and *Grujović* urging them to rely on their own forces in forging Serbia's administration²⁸). The Metropolitan also noted that the insurgents should not molest peaceful Turks but should seek to assimilate them. He added that education must be fostered and that Orthodox Christian norms should become the source of jurisprudence in Serbia and supplant the *Shari'a*²⁹). Turkish words should be replaced by the "purest Serbian or Slavic words", and the turban (*çalma*) by the Bulgarian fur headdress, or, even better, Western-style hats. All leaders must submit to *Karadjordje* and seek to tame his fury with their own mildness. *Stratimirović* exalted at the rebels' good fortune in choosing the most opportune time for the uprising: "All the kings are at war between themselves; they have no time to think about you." That is why arrangements should be made that "whether they like it or not in Stamboul, matters remain just as you have fixed them."

There are reasons to believe that *Stratimirović's* optimism subsequently gave way to a feeling that the Serbs could at best gain autonomy within the Ottoman state (rather like the neighboring Wallachs³⁰). He was shaken by the 1807 insurrection of the Srijem peasants, who, inspired by the Serbian revolution, made no allowances for the privileged status of the church estates. At the same time, his caution was heightened by the discovery that he was the object of intense surveillance by the Austrian police. Nevertheless, he remained *Karadjordje's* reliable ally, ever ready to urge unity onto the feuding Serbian chiefs. Though his influence in Serbia declined, his learned emissaries continued to cross the Sava, spreading the Metropolitan's appeals on behalf of the rule of law and the increase of literacy and education.

Stratimirović's message was best served by *Dositej Obradović* (1742—1811), the most prominent Serb thinker of his time and *Karadjordje's* first director of schools and minister of education. A native of the Banat and a former monk of Hopovo (Srijem), *Dositej* was a unique individual for the time. Widely traveled (at different times he traversed the whole of the enormous pentagram that links Morea, Smyrna, Iași, Leipzig, and London), a polyglot (in addition to several Slavic tongues he learned and taught Greek, Italian, German, French, English, and Latin), and a beneficiary of German university education (he studied at Halle and Leipzig), *Dositej* ardently believed that the future of the Serbs depended on their readiness to accept Western cultural and educational modes. As a result, his prolific writings, all employing the popular Serbian idiom, were chiefly didactic:

²⁸) The letter can be found in Nikola Radojčić, *Dositejevo pismo o uredjenju i prosvećenju Srbije*, *Letopis Matice srpske*, 96 (1914—1921), no. 300, pp. 8—33. Radojčić erroneously attributed this letter in large part to *Dositej Obradović*. Cf. Gavrilović, *op. cit.*, p. 30, n. 65.

²⁹) Radojčić, *Dositejevo pismo*, p. 24.

³⁰) Gavrilović, *Vojvodina...*, p. 39.

Dositej popularized the natural sciences and ethics, spoke in favor of his people's cultural enlightenment, and reasoned against superstition and ignorance³¹). He was filled with great joy at the news of *Karadjordje's* uprising. "Pjesna na insurekciju Serbianov" (A Poem on the Insurrection of the Serbs, 1804) with its moving exhortation ("Vostani Serbie! vostani carice!" — "Rise up, O Serbia! Rise up, O empress!") testifies to *Dositej's* complete identification with the revolution from its inception³²).

Dositej did not settle permanently in Serbia until August 1807, but he performed various services for the insurgents well before that time. He was entrusted with a series of delicate diplomatic missions, and he pursued his educational vocation. He became a member of the *Sovjet* in 1808, and in that capacity helped organize various educational endeavors, the most important of which was the *Velika škola*, a creation of several Vojvodina intellectuals. This school had as its principal aim the education of Serbia's first administrative and judicial personnel, and it was attended by the sons of various revolutionary leaders, including one of *Karadjordje's* children. The curriculum included history, Roman law, mathematics, a bit of physics, ethics, letter writing, German, and geography. The school cannot, properly speaking, be classed as an institution of higher education, as some historians (Andra Gavrilović) have claimed, but it was a great advance under Serbian conditions.

In addition to his educational pursuits, *Dositej* greatly contributed to the national program of the revolution. He was opposed to reliance on either Russia or the Habsburgs, and looked forward to Serbia's full independence. Programs that would make Serbia an appendage of any of the great powers had no appeal to *Dositej*, although, at the same time, he favored taking aid from any quarter. But whether they shared *Dositej's* orientation (close enough to that of *Stratimirović*)³³), or whether they spoke up for Russian or Habsburg tutelage,

³¹) *Dositej's* work is accurately appraised in the following conclusion of Dragan M. Jeremić: "Had *Dositej* been an original thinker in all of his stands, he would have been one of the great philosophers of European Enlightenment. He, however, mainly compiled and adapted the enlighteners of his time, drawing from the works of Wolff, Shaftesbury, Eberhard, Lessing, Marmontel, Addison, etc. That is why his significance lies mainly in the area of practical enlightenment of the Serbs." Jeremić cites the opinion of Prvoš Slankamenac, who stressed that *Dositej* "was a type of an Enlightenment philosopher still with the virginal earmarks of the movement." Dragan M. Jeremić, O filozofiji kod Srba, *Savremenik*, Belgrade, May, 1967, pp. 404, 407.

³²) On *Dositej's* participation in the revolutionary effort see esp. Božidar Kovačević, *Dositej Obradović u Prvom srpskom ustanku*. Belgrade: Prosveta, 1953, and K. N. Milutinović, *Dositej i Karadjordje*, *Letopis Matice srpske*, January-February, 1941, pp. 24—46.

³³) Claims that *Dositej* and *Stratimirović* were at odds, that *Obradović* was a "national revolutionary" and an atheist, whereas the Metropolitan represented "clerical reaction" and played a puppet to Vienna, are totally devoid of any foundation. For a typical example of such nonsense see Kosta Milutinović, Prilog proučavanju *Dositejevog* revolucionarstva, *Zbornik Matice srpske: Serija društvenih nauka*, 1954, 7, pp. 167—169.

Vojvodina intellectuals fostered Serbian statehood, the traditions of which, dormant since the time of the despots, were considerably revived with the "Great Migration."

It has already been noted that the Serbs of Vojvodina imposed the aim of statehood and independence on an essentially peasant uprising which initially was not noted for a long-range vision. To be sure, the growing successes of the insurgents whetted their efforts for a full mastery over Serbia. Nevertheless, the shift from the initial loyalist goals (conceived as aid to the forces of reformed Sultanic order against *dayn* reaction) to the mature goals of national independence and the overthrow of Ottoman serfdom cannot be appreciated without a consideration of the ideological influence that the Vojvodina churchmen and burghers exercised on *Karadjordje's* men.

Eighteenth-century baroque historicism flourished among the Serbs of Vojvodina not only as a reflection of broad intellectual trends in this Westernized milieu, but especially because Serb privileges could be defended only by judiciously marshaled historical arguments. It was important to demonstrate that the Serbs were the heirs of the same dignity of nature as the Hungarians and the other "integral" and "historical" nations of the Habsburg Monarchy. Relying on the works of the Croat baroque historians (*Mavro Orbin*, *Jakov Lukarević*, *Ivan Lucius [Lučić]*, and later *Pavao Ritter Vitezović*) from the crusading outposts on the Ottoman frontier, Vojvodina Serb writers, from Count *Djordje Branković* (the self-proclaimed "Dei Gratia omnium Illyriae Thraciae caeterarumque Orientalium & Septemtrionalium Ditionum Proavus Patriae Haereditarius Despota", (1645—1711) to the enlightened Archimandrite *Jovan Rajić* (1726—1801), defended the worthiness of the Serbs by harking back to the glories of Serbia's medieval Nemanjić line, relying more often than not on transmitted embellishments and fancies³⁴). As one literary historian recently put it, "Nevertheless, in all of these largely unrealistic proposals and proofs, one idea was correct: Serbs once had their own state with rulers of their own blood, language, and religion, and from that fact also flowed the legitimate right to renew that state"³⁵). In short, the nascent baroque historiography not only familiarized the increasingly cultivated Vojvodina burghers with the past of their people but also opened up for them visions of revived Serbian statehood. More so than any other Serb institution, the Metropolitanate of Karlovci united these patriotic trends into a powerful, mobilizing cult which blended ecclesiastical and nationalist themes.

Well before 1690, the Serbian church canonized the royal Nemanjić lineage (except for *Stefan Dušan*, the greatest of them all) and also several of the despots. As hallowed receptacles of healing unguents, the *Nemanjić* "holy vine" and its successors were venerated in the liturgy of the saints, an inspiration in the strug-

³⁴) For an excellent survey of this subject see Milorad Pavić, *Istorija srpske književnosti baroknog doba (XVII i XVIII vek)*. Belgrade: Nolit, 1970, pp. 325—354.

³⁵) Dejan Medaković, *Kult kneza Lazara u srpskom baroku*, in: *O knezu Lazaru*. Naučni skup u Kruševcu, ed. Ivan Božić and Vojislav J. Djurić. Belgrade and Kruševac: Filozofski fakultet and Narodni muzej, 1975, p. 328.

gle against Vienna's attempts to impose church union on the Orthodox and a constant reminder of past spiritual and political stature. Midway in the eighteenth century, the church began stirring up these cults into renewed vitality, and the Fruška Gora monasteries in Srijem, the final resting places of the Serbian saints, became places of devout veneration. The blessed relics had in some cases been brought there on the shoulders of the most recent migrants, as in the case *St. Lazar*, the Κεφαλοφόρος martyr-prince of the Kosovo epic, whose remains were transferred from Serbian Ravanica and reached Vrdnik in Srijem in 1697. In addition to the prince's shrine, those of St. Young Tsar *Uroš* at Jazak, of the venerable *Brankovićes* at Krušedol, and of St. Despot *Stefan Štiljanović* at Šišatovac, radiated new significance to prayerful worshippers, frequently as a challenge to Habsburg policies³⁶).

The high point of the new piety was reached in 1741 with the publication of the famous "Stemmatografia", the artistic handiwork of *Hristofor Žefarović* (d. 1753), an "ardent Illyrico-Rascian general icon-painter of Bulgarian origin" (ἸΛΛΥΡῬΙΚΟ ΡΑССΙἸАНСКІЙ ὉΨΙἸ ΖῶΓΡΑΦῶ ΡΕΒΗΝΙΤΕΛῶ ΟΥΤΕΣΤΒΑ ΒΟΛΓΑΡΣΚΑΓΩ), behind whom stood Patriarch *Arsenije IV Jovanović Šakabenta*, the actual organizer of the work and its secret editor.³⁷) This odd work consisted of several disconnected parts but the most space was taken by a Slavo-Serbian translation of a heraldic manual by *Pavao Ritter Vitezović* (1652—1713), a Croat polyhistor; this was the "Stemmatographia, sive Armorum Illyricorum delineatio, descriptio, et restitutio", first published in Vienna some forty years before³⁸).

Some of *Vitezović's* coats-of-arms had been inspired by *Mavro Orbin* and other sources, and some had simply been invented by this gifted Senj nobleman who wanted to present the arms of entire Illyricum, a term synonymous with the Croat lands in seventeenth-century Croat usage. Moreover, *Vitezović* extended the Illyrian — indeed Croat name — to all the Slavs, etching the emblems of Muscovy and Poland in his "Illyrian" heraldry. And precisely because *Vitezović* counted all the Slavs (including the Serbs) within the Croat nation, he embraced the arms of "Imperium à Nemanide institutum", "Rassia" (Rascia), and "Serblia", in addition to most other Balkan lands, within his "Stemmatographia".

Žefarović and *Thomas Messmer*, a young Viennese engraver, simply copied *Vitezović's* heraldic designs, including translations of his original verses. In addition, the volume had portraits of the mainly Serbian and Bulgarian holy kings and archpriests and two plates with images of Tsar *Stefan Dušan*. One of these was a

³⁶) Ibidem, p. 329.

³⁷) Hristofor Žefarović and Toma Mesmer, *Stematografija: Izobraženij oružij iliričeskijh: Fototipsko izdanje*, ed. Dinko Davidov, Novi Sad: Galerija Matice srpske, 1972. Davidov's introduction is a noteworthy interpretation of the origins of the work. See especially the discussion on the role of *Arsenije IV*, pp. 26—31. Cf. Pavić, pp. 341—342.

³⁸) For a discussion of *Vitezović's* "Stemmatographia" and his ideas on Croat and Slavic nationhood see Ivo Banac, *Pavao Ritter Vitezović and the Origins of Croat Nationalism*, paper presented at the 93rd meeting of the American Historical Association, San Francisco, December 29, 1978.

typically baroque portrait of “Stefan Nemanjić, all glorious and mighty Serbian tsar,” wearing Western-style armor and crown; the other showed a triumphant sword-bearing “Mighty Stefan” astride a white horse on a field of weapons, crowned by winged Minerva, and surrounded by all the “Illyrian” arms. In other words, *Žefarović* and his ecclesiastical patrons turned tables on *Vitezović* and used his Illyrian iconography to assert the unity of the South Slavs under Serbian aegis, within *Stefan Dušan*’s mystical realm. In the process, they hoped to reveal “the entire Serbian empire” (СЕРБСКО ЦРЪТВО ЦѢЛО) to the enthusiastic reader, who was to be “delivered of ignorance of Serbian past”³⁹), and, it was assumed, awakened to the need to help revive the empire of *Stefan Dušan*.

This prospect was precisely the intent of *Arsenije IV*, the refugee Patriarch of Peć and of “entire Illyricum”, who conceived the printing of the “Stemmatografia” in an attempt to reaffirm the privileges that the Serbs enjoyed in two empires and to reassert his jurisdiction over the entire Balkan Orthodox fold. As *Žefarović* put it in the volume’s rhymed dedicatory:

И сѐ Крѣйна причина естѣ Моєгѡ дѣла
 Утѡ предѣли в Книзѣ Сєй Іллырїна цѣла
 Тѣже ѣгѡ Патрїархъ : и наслѣднимъ правѡмъ
 Сбдилъ есѣ предѣлшъ прѣ Совѣтѣ здравѡмъ
 Провїнциї и црѣтва, предѣли и стрѣни
 [І]ллырїка Вєтхагѡ Нашѣ тѣпомъ данни
 Къ ѡтечѣствѡ Нашемѡ Сєрбскѡ Надлежѣхѡ

And here is the final aim of my work:

That the entire ILLYRIA be represented in this book
 You are its PATRIARCH: and by hereditary right
 You judged these lands in a sound council
 Provinces and empires, regions and lands
 Of old Illyricum given in our type
 Belong to our Serbian fatherland⁴⁰).

The Patriarch was thus affirmed as the standard bearer of Serbian political resurgence, and the Metropolitans of Karlovci dutifully pursued this task down to *Stratimirović*.

More so than any other single work, the “Stemmatografia” influenced the revival of the late eighteenth-century ecclesiastical art of the Vojvodina Serbs. It became an iconographic manual, a model for the rapidly spreading baroque visual style which slowly supplanted the Byzantine influences in Serbian church art. And, of course, *Žefarović*’s portraits of Serbian saints influenced the current enthusiasm for the fresco galleries of the hallowed Serbian rulers who conquered Orthodox churches in the Monarchy and beyond. From *Krušedol*’s famous ves-

³⁹) *Žefarović* and Mesmer, op. cit., folio 53.

⁴⁰) *Ibidem*, folio 11.

tibule (1750s), to Rács Keve in Hungary, Daruvar in Slavonia (1785), and as far as Rila in Bulgaria, the muralists and icon painters emulated *Žefarović's* graphic solutions, while spreading the message of Serbian statehood⁴¹).

The Vienna court well understood the portent of the new piety. During the last decades of the reign of *Maria Theresia*, Serbian saints — with the exception of *St. Sava* — were erased from the Orthodox church calendar. The effect of these measures was almost opposite to what was intended. Enlightened thinkers, such as *Rajić* and *Dositej Obradović*, laicized the cults of the saints, while retaining their patriotic essence. It was in this form that the ideology of statehood reached the 1804 insurgents, although the influence of Vojvodina's patriotic piety was much felt in Serbia even before the revolution. (*Osman-efendi*, the *naib* of Valjevo, pointed out in 1806 that the Serbs “constantly hold in their hands books about the history of [Prince *Lazar*] and he is a great instigator of revolt in their reason”)⁴²). In the course of the revolution *Dositej* himself urged Vojvodina painters to come to Serbia for the express purpose of painting the churches with the images of the royal saints, and many responded to his call. Directly or indirectly, the “Stemmatografija” was tremendously important in fostering *Karadjordje's* increasing consciousness of statehood, and it established the heraldic iconography of the revolution⁴³).

Karadjordje's first standard was decorated in 1804 by *Stefan Gavrilović*, a painter of Karlovci. Besides the image of *St. Stefan Prvovjenčani* (King Stephen the First-Crowned), it bore the arms of Serbia from *Vitezović* and *Žefarović*, with *Žefarović's* free Slavo-Serbian translation of the following Latin couplet from *Vitezović's* original “Stemmatographia”:

Signa Crucem, calybesq; rubro fert Serblia campo
Pro Cruce non paucos Serblia passa focos.

Крѣтъ ѡцила, СѢРБЛІИ СТОАТЪ НАПИСАНИ
ѠАДИ Крѣта вѢ ѠТУЕСТВѢ МНОГИ ПРІАБРАНИ.
НИѢ КрѣтѢ ПРОСТЕРТѢ, ПАКИ ОУМЪЗВЛАЮТЪ,
ТАКЪ ДѢЛШЪ СѢРБИЮ ПРАВО НАРИЦАЮТЪ .

On the red field Serbia bears the signs of Cross
and firestone
For the Cross Serbia passed through not a few
fires⁴⁴).

⁴¹) Dejan Medaković, *Nacionalna istorija Srba u svetlosti crkvene umetnosti novijeg doba*, in: *Putevi srpskog baroka* by Dejan Medaković, Belgrade: Nolit, 1971, pp. 71—84.

⁴²) Cited in Medaković, *Kult kneza Lazara*, p. 335.

⁴³) Miodrag Kolarić, *Likovna kultura Karadjordjevog vremena*, *Istoriski glasnik*, Belgrade, 1951, 1—2, pp. 66—67.

⁴⁴) Milorad Panić-Surep, ed., *Prvi srpski ustanak: Katalog izložbe*. Belgrade: Odbor za priredjivanje izložbe spomenika i dokumenata Prvog srpskog ustanka, 1954,

In 1804 *Gavrilović* also painted a rebel standard with the white double-headed eagle of the *Nemanjić* state, taken from the “Stemmatografia”, and then the flag of *Hadži-Melentije Stefanović*, decorated with the *Vitezović* arms of Serbia, Bosnia, and Rama (part of Bosnia)⁴⁵). Most importantly, the emblem of the *Praviteljstvujušči Sovjet* featured the seals of Serbia and Triballia, also from the “Stemmatografia”, the latter seal most likely invented by the Croat heraldist⁴⁶). Exactly the same imagery was emblazoned on two additional surviving banners of *Karadjordje*, and on the standard of *Pop-Luka Lazarević* the *vojvoda* of the *Šabac nahiye*⁴⁷).

The revolution’s most popular iconographic motif, however, was the image of an equestrian, crest-encircled *Stefan Dušan*. This triumphant figure was based directly on *Žefarović*, enriched by the *Žefarović*-inspired drawing in “Slavenoserbskomu Rodu i Obščestvu” (To the Slavo-Serbian Race and Community, Buda, 1798, 1806), a pamphlet by the Lieutenant *Nikola Stamatović*, a Serb military frontiersman, who reprinted *Žefarović*’s portrait of the tsar with a note that the empire of *Stefan Dušan* fell because of disunity and that the Serbs did not receive due recognition for the blood they spilled in the service of the Habsburg⁴⁸). Serbian leaders like *Mladen Milovanović* knew both the “Stemmatografia” and *Stamatović*’s pamphlet.

Portraits of *Stefan Dušan* found their way to the battle standards, as in the case of a flag long kept at the Gornjak monastery on the Mlava. And in 1807 the insurgents printed an engraving with yet another equestrian portrait of the tsar and then illegally circulated it in the Habsburg Military Frontier⁴⁹). As in the “Stemmatografia”, the message of the gravure — actually a fully “modern” political broadsheet — was that all the lands of the *Nemanjić* crown (but in actuality the entire Balkan peninsula) should be united within the emerging Serbian state. *Karadjordje* himself reflected this vision when he included the arms of Serbia, Bosnia, and the *Nemanjić* state (all based on the “Stemmatografia”) on his personal signet. Similar aspirations were advanced in a fully mature form in 1806, when *Sava Tekelija* composed, printed, and distributed 2000 copies of his map of the Serb lands, among which he counted not only Serbia proper, but also Bosnia,

p. 48. The inscription on the banner was derived from Paulus Ritter [*Vitezović*], *Stemmatographia, sive Armorum Illyricorum delineatio, descriptio, et restitutio*. Vienna, 1701, p. 41. Cf. *Žefarović* and Mesmer, op. cit., folio 33.

⁴⁵) Kolarić, *Likovna kultura*, p. 67, and Panić-Surep, op. cit., p. 51.

⁴⁶) Kolarić, *Likovna kultura*, p. 69. “Triballia” (after the ancient Thracian tribe of Triballi, who inhabited the right bank of the Danube from the upper flow of the Morava to the upper reaches of the Iskür in present-day northeastern Serbia and northwestern Bulgaria), was the term favored by Byzantine authors as a synonym for Serbia. The arms of Triballia — an arrow-pierced head of a wild boar — entered heraldry with *Vitezović*.

⁴⁷) Panić-Surep, op. cit., pp. 49—50.

⁴⁸) A. Djukić, C. Kr. poručnik Nikola Stamatović, *Brankovo kolo*, Sr. Karlovci, September 7, 1905, p. 1058.

⁴⁹) Kolarić, *Likovna kultura*, pp. 69—70.

Dalmatia, Dubrovnik, and Montenegro. The action of this Vojvodina jurist was meant — in his own words — „to introduce the Serb people to the state of liberty“. What *Tekelija* actually did was to provide the insurgents with a program of territorial expansion by counterposing liberated Serbia to what he considered to be its unredeemed parts, “in Cyril's letters so that the Serb can read it”⁵⁰).

Not surprisingly, considering the ideational impact of the “Stemmatografīa” and its practical application in the insurrection, the volume ultimately fell under the scrutiny of the Habsburg censorship. The seemingly innocuous heraldic manual no longer deceived the Austrian authorities, and in 1807 their agents either bought out the entire remaining stock of the “Stemmatografīa” and *Stamatović's* pamphlet in Vojvodina's bookstores, or banned outright similar nationalist tracts and song sheets⁵¹). Baron *Josef von Simbschen*, the commanding general of the Slavonian Military Frontier, issued the following denunciation:

Ohngeachtet dieses Werk [the “Stemmatografīa”] dazumal vielleicht in einer unschuldigen Absicht und bloss um die illirische Jugend, in der Wappenkunde zu unterrichten, verfasst worden seyn mag, so machen dennoch die servischen Rebellen-Anführer und Oberhäupter, dermalen einen revolutionairen und in der Folge dem allerhöchsten Kayser-Haus von Oestreich schädlich werden könnenden Gebrauch davon, in denen sie in dem darauf folgenden Kupferblatte, welche[s] die Krönung des Steffan Nemanics [Stefan Dušan] zum servischen Kayser vorstellt, der zu Pferd sitzet und die Siegeszeichen der überwundenen Nationen mit des Pferds-Füsse tritt, alle daselbst herumschwebenden Wappen, wovon die Benennung in der Beylage Nr. 4 folget, als jene Reiche und Länder angeben, die zu dem ehemaligen servischen Kayserthum gehörten und deren widerumige Eroberung und Einverleibung durch den Synod beschlossen und durch die servische Nation bewürket werden müsse, worunter sie auch gesamte, in denen k. k. Erbstaaten befindliche Illirier oder Servier der nicht unirten orientalischen kristlichen Religion zählen und die leider gröstentheils mit vielen Entusiasmus und Religions-Fanatismus, den Wunsch högen, wieder mit Vereinigung der disseits gelegenen Provinzen, das alte servische Reich herzustellen und mit Aufhebung der hungarischen Constitution eine selbständige Nation auszumachen.

Dieses sind eigentlich die allgemeinen Volksmeinungen welche die Servier aus denen Sagen der Vorzeit, stolz auf ihr Waffenglück gegen die Türken, durch ausgeschickte Emissairs, in denen diessseitigen Landen vorzüglich aber im Szyrmier und Bacser Comitatz zu verbreiten beflissen sind⁵²).

Simbschen's exaggerations do not detract from the essential soundness of his perception. State-building ideology that came from Vojvodina broadened the horizons of Serbian leaders and became central to Serb aspirations in both empires. To be sure, to the extent that Western enlightenment currents were congruous with the Serb proto-nationalist concerns, they also exercised an influence on the revolution's emerging preoccupation with national independence⁵³).

⁵⁰) Popović, Sava *Tekelija*, pp. 123—124.

⁵¹) Gavrilović, *Vojvodina...*, p. 126, n. 250.

⁵²) Ivić, ed., *Spisi...*: Knjiga četvrta — godina 1807. Subotica: Srpska Kraljevska Akademija, 1938, pp. 829—830.

⁵³) To some extent, the influence of French rationalist thought and of the French revolution reinforced Serb disaffection with Habsburg rule. On the reception of French

On the whole, however, the Serbs of the Belgrade *pašalik* were spiritually alien to Western Europe. The world of the Balkan peasantry was left to its own devices with the migration of the nation's spiritual and political elite in 1690. The revival of the epic tradition in Serbia, morally ambiguous, but atavistic — and thereby anti-Ottoman — to the core, cannot be separated from the decline of Christian influence and the corresponding retreat into essentially paganistic world of pre-Christian heroic mythology⁵⁴). The only bridge that connected the enlightened (albeit Christian) and the patriarchal-atavistic (albeit enterprising) banks of the Sava and the Danube was patriotism. The semi-pietistic, state-evoking patriotism of Vojvodina blended with the epic world of the Kosovo cycle to become the ideology of the Serbian revolution. This ideology gripped an increasingly effective armed people who were taking the first steps in the construction of their very own governing institutions. Thus there was all the more reason to anticipate that transmuted Serbian nationalism would return to Vojvodina in a more potent form. As *Savić-Jugović* put it to his students in Belgrade:

Мечемъ паки прославлѣни,
 Радостію восхищени
 Трубимъ гласно по вселеной
 Братіи нашой разселеной:
 Сербія царица
 Пресвѣтлаго лица
 Скиптеръ сама держитъ свой.

language and thought in Vojvodina see: Nikola Gavrilović, Francuski jezik kod Srba u Južnoj Ugarskoj krajem XVIII i početkom XIX veka, *Rad vojvodjanskih muzeja*, Novi Sad, 25—27 (1966—1968), pp. 47—59; Mita Kostić, Volter kod Srba, *Glas* (SANU), Belgrade, 240 (1960) no. 5, pp. 49—68. Habsburg Croats and Serbs became acquainted with revolutionary France in a very practical way: more than half of the Habsburg army that confronted the French from 1792 to 1815, that is, for some 23 years with few respites, was made up of Croat and Serb military frontier regiments and *Freikorps*. Some of these soldiers, especially those captured by the French, became sympathizers and supporters of French political ideas. Similar sentiments were occasionally expressed among Vojvodina intellectuals. *Jakov Sečanac*, one of the electors at the Temesvár Assembly, proposed to the other participants that the French example of equality of estates be followed at Temesvár. He also supported the idea of a separate Serbian territory in Vojvodina. Some of his contemporaries went still further and espoused French intervention on behalf of “Illyrian citizens” who wished to rise up against “les oppresseurs impitoyable de leur superieurs [les oppresseurs impitoyables, leur supérieurs].” See: Mémoire d’un serbe de Vienne sur la situation des serbes de la Hongrie, *Le Monde slave*, Paris, April 1933, pp. 124—126. On the French revolutionary influence among the Habsburg Serbs see: Mita Kostić, Nekoliko idejnih odraza Francuske revolucije u našem društvu krajem 18 i početkom 19 veka, *Zbornik Matice srpske: Serija društvenih nauka*, 1952, 3, pp. 5—19; Nikola Gavrilović, Velika Francuska revolucija i Srbi u Južnoj Ugarskoj, *Zbornik Matice Srpske: Serija društvenih nauka*, 1960, 26, pp. 18—39.

⁵⁴) For an engaging, if somewhat immoderate, study of this phenomenon see Miodrag Popović, *Vidovdan i krst časni: Ogled iz književne arheologije*. Belgrade: Slovo ljubve, 1976.

Glorified once again by sword,
Enraptured by happiness
We proclaim by trumpet through the world
To our scattered brothers:
Serbia, the empress
Most illustrious visage
By herself her scepter holds⁵⁵).

Insurgent Serbia was not merely a receiver of influences from kinsmen to the north of the Sava and the Danube. The growth of Serbian statehood on the basis of free peasant smallholding profoundly influenced the course of rural stirrings among the peasants and military frontiersmen in the Habsburg lands. This influence was felt particularly in the Srijem district of Civil Slavonia and in the Banat Military Frontier, where the local rebellions involved more than purely agrarian social concerns and developed all the earmarks of nationalist movements.

It would be misleading to portray Karadjordjian Serbia as the exclusive mainspring for a series of agrarian rebellions which beset the southern Habsburg borderlands during the first decades of the nineteenth century. These convulsions largely developed in accordance with their peculiar inner logic, stemming from a combination of factors, principal among which was the crisis of urbarial relations and Vienna's deficit financing, compounded by the cost of foreign wars and widespread domestic scarcity. Nevertheless, *Karadjordje's* successes in the war against the Ottomans certainly suggested a vivid alternative to the prevailing situation in Vojvodina and the other Habsburg possessions.

Srijem County was the epicenter of Habsburg peasant rebellions. Together with the other two Slavonian counties, Srijem received its Urbarium from *Maria Theresia* in 1756. The striking feature of this feudal regulation was that although the corvée obligations (*rabota*) were less than half the number of days the peasants owed in Civil Croatia, Bačka, or the Banat, the Urbarium did not limit the landlord in arbitrarily exacting still more forced labor provided the landlord compensated the peasant with a sum of twelve Kreuzers for every additional workday. The peasant's right to redeem himself from the fixed *rabota* obligations by means of monetary payments was thus seriously circumvented by the landlord's right, upon payment of a small fee, to impose the same obligations in excess of their fixed number⁵⁶).

With the steady progress of industrialization in western and central Europe, markets were created for Vojvodina's agricultural products, especially cereals.

⁵⁵) Karadžić, op. cit., p. 271.

⁵⁶) For an excellent study of the peasant movements in Slavonia (including Srijem), see two works by Slavko Gavrilović: *Agrarni pokreti u Sremu i Slavoniji početkom XIX veka*. Belgrade: SANU, 1960, and *Seljački pokret u Sremu u doba Prvog srpskog ustanka*, *Zbornik Matice srpske: Serija društvenih nauka*, 1954, 7, pp. 7—48. Archival sources on this subject have been published in Živan Sečanski, ed., *Gradja o Ticanovoj buni u Sremu 1807 godine*. Belgrade: SANU, 1952.

The monetary benefits of export spurred the landlords to extend and develop their allodial economy by reducing the area of cultivable land rented to the peasants and by adding to the number of paid *rabota* days. The boom in cereal production was therefore accompanied by the heightening in the landlords' demands on the peasants' time, which in turn resulted in a decrease in productivity on the peasants' rented lands. Moreover, Vienna was increasingly covering its wartime deficit budgets by issuing devalued paper currency, so that the ensuing financial crisis precluded any economic emancipation of the peasants. The rural population was left only with its traditional faith in state reforms, largely an idle hope after the death of *Joseph II* in 1790⁵⁷).

The only other possible sources of relief were flight to Serbia, something that occurred in a limited way even during the prerevolutionary period, or rebellion. *Jacqueries* were all the more likely because of the region's history of wars and upheavals. In addition, through their participation in the Habsburg campaigns against the French, *Vojvodina's* peasants and military frontiersmen were at least indirectly acquainted with the abolition of feudal dues in France. Even so, the unrest might not have culminated in a wave of peasant uprisings had it not been for the immediate influence and example of the Serbian revolution.

The first recorded peasant uprising occurred in 1806. (The winter rebellion in the *Srijem* village of *Maradik* remains a rather obscure event, with almost no mention in the sources.) The rebellion that took place on the *Dalj* estate of the *Karlovci* Metropolitanate in *Virovitica* County between June 8 and 18 was apparently provoked by the landlord's insistence on prohibiting the peasants access to the pasture lands and forests belonging to the estate⁵⁸). The peasants removed their village *knezes* and appointed new ones. *Teodor Enderić*, the local archpriest and the leader of the movement, was a veteran of the 1788–1790 Ottoman wars. The movement was specifically directed against *Teodor Stratimirović*, a nephew of the Metropolitan and the manager of the estate. The punishments handed down by the county courts were relatively mild, primarily because of the moderate and conciliatory attitude of Metropolitan *Stratimirović*. This remained his tactic in all the subsequent rebellions, despite the fact that the differences in the interests between the church hierarchy and the Serb peasants and military frontiersmen continued to widen.

In the cases of both *Meradik* and *Dalj*, documentary evidence suggests no direct influence of the Serbian revolution. It was quite otherwise with the more far-reaching *Srijem* rebellion of April 1807, a week-long insurrection of Serb peasants which was attended with some bloodshed at the hands of the superior Habsburg forces. Historiography has traditionally associated this armed uprising with the name of *Teodor Avramović-Tican*, who was the leader of the most militant wing of the rebellion. This *novi kapetan* (New Captain), as a folksong had it, came from the poorest element in the *Srijem* village of *Jazak*, but he had had schooling in

⁵⁷) Gavrilović, *Agrarni pokreti*, pp. 16–20.

⁵⁸) For a detailed analysis of the *Dalj* rebellion see *ibidem*, pp. 23–34.

Zemun, his expenses paid by a local Greek merchant who was the employer of *Tican's* parents. The decisive influence in *Tican's* development was undoubtedly his seventeen years of volunteer military service in various Habsburg units, including *Mihaljević's* and *Wurmser's Freikorps* and *Jelačić's* regiment. During his long military career, *Tican* served in the wars against France on several fronts, including those fought on French territory. There, and as a French prisoner of war, he had ample opportunity to acquaint himself with the accomplishments of the French revolution. His release from French captivity in 1797, after he promised never again to fight against the French, as well as the later Habsburg charges that this *futurus Bonaparte* intended to repeat *Napoleon's* feats in Srijem, testify to *Tican's* wholehearted acceptance of revolutionary ideas, at the time when *Bonaparte's* name was synonymous with that of the Great Revolution⁵⁹). *Tican*, however, was not among the organizers of the Srijem rebellion that eventually came to bear his name, and it had far closer ties with *Karadjordje's* Serbia than *Tican* himself ever developed.

The very existence of insurgent Serbia in the close proximity of Srijem's allodial estates increased the possibility of peasant uprisings, if only because Serbia offered a ready refuge in case of defeat. In fact, as we have seen, even before the beginning of *Tican's* rebellion, many Serb peasants and frontiersmen fled to Serbia and participated in the campaigns of *Karadjordje's* army. In addition, the universal euphoria that swept the Serb villages in Vojvodina after the initial successes of the revolution could not but serve as an example in the struggle against the "baptized Turks," the Srijem landlords, whose claims to the excess peasant labor and restrictions on the the peasant land-use were at the heart of the crisis of urbarial relations.

Among the Srijem peasants who had close ties with *Karadjordje's* commanders of the Šabac and Valjevo *nahiye* were the villagers from Voganj, near Ruma. One of them, the village schoolteacher *Andrija Popović (Andra barjaktar)*, who was noted for his patriotic sentiments, was discharged from Habsburg service in 1805 and then traveled to Serbia and spent three months with the Šabac commander, Pop-Luka Lazarević. After his return to Voganj in 1806, *Popović* succeeded in organizing a group of collaborators, principal among whom was *Teodor Avramović-Vrbavac*, the village headman. This circle's organizational groundwork paved the way for the subsequent rebellion. Throughout this preparatory stage, the Voganj group maintained its ties with *Lazarević* and supplied his units with flour and grain⁶⁰).

⁵⁹) Sečanski, op. cit., p. 82. For a concise biography of *Tican* see Slavko Gavrilović, Teodor Avramović-Tican: Istoriski portret, *Rad vojvodjanskih muzeja*, 3 (1954), pp. 107—118.

⁶⁰) Slavko Gavrilović, Andrija Popović, učesnik u Ticanovoj buni i Prvom ustanku. *Prilozi za političku, kulturnu i privrednu istoriju Vojvodine. Zbornik državnih arhiva Vojvodine*, Novi Sad, 4 (1954), pp. 33—44. Cf. Gavrilović, Agrarni pokreti, pp. 36—37.

After the conspirators became satisfied that all the preparations were completed, they sent a letter to *Lazarević* in which they announced their intention to start an uprising and demanded aid from Serbia. *Lazarević* and *Karadjordje*, who was consulted in the case, were perfectly aware that aid to the insurgents meant courting disaster in relations with Vienna, but at the same time they did not wish to disappoint the Srijem peasants. *Lazarević* therefore informed the messengers from Voganj that Serbia could not help them, and counseled them to rely on their own resources⁶¹). This sobering advice probably did not make a strong impression because of the counterclaims disseminated by the scores of Srijem émigrés in Serbia, who continued to reassure the conspirators that *Karadjordje* would not fail to send his units to their aid as soon as they rose up, and some of *Karadjordje's* *vojvode* may even have encouraged such sentiments on their own authority. Austrian informers certainly attributed irredentist views to *Mladen Milovanović*, who was held to be a vocal advocate of unification with Srijem and the Banat⁶²).

When the conspirators realized that the Habsburg authorities had detected some signs of the plot, they were forced to advance the date of the insurrection. On April 6, 1807, they mobilized their forces, marched to Vrdnik, and proclaimed the beginning of the insurrection outside the Vrdnik monastery, the new Ravanica, where the relics of Prince *Lazar* had reposed since 1697, after being removed from the Serbian Ravanica of the holy κήρυξ. The symbolic value of this site cannot be stressed too much. The rebel leaders clearly wanted to draw on the traditional yearning of the Serbs for the resurrection of the *Nemanjić* state. Though the unfavorable status of the peasants on Srijem's allodial estates certainly prepared the grounds for the rebellion, the restoration of Serbian statehood and the unification with Serbia decisively guided the insurgents' action. As an interrogator later put it to captured *Tican*:

Tu dixisti, quod sis futurus Bonaparte et hoc velis efficere hic, quod ille in Gallia, tu cum Andria Shashinczensi [a frontiersman-deserter from Šašinci] Mittroviczii intercepto vario modo concitare intendisti populum varias antiquas historias hinc inde narrando, de Serborum regno restituendo sollicitus eras et varia loquebaris, fatearis, unde et a quo tale consilium caperis, gatearis et id, unde habeas, quod a 450 annis ultimus ducum vel prout dixeras caesarum Servianorum regnaverit et illo mortuo velitis iterum regnum restabilire, prout et caesarem Serborum revivisci facere⁶³).

Habsburg authorities for the most part dismissed the insurgents' pleas for relief in urbarial relations as transparent subterfuge. Every established order does what it can to attribute its internal difficulties to outside factors, of course, but the Habsburg officials were right in concluding that Serb patriotism played a decisive role in the Srijem uprising. This influence is partly supported by the fact the rebellion failed to gain ground among Croat, German, and Magyar peasants in

⁶¹) Sečanski, op. cit., p. 126.

⁶²) Gavrilović, Vojvodina i Srbija, p. 82.

⁶³) Sečanski, op. cit., p. 82.

Srijem and the other neighboring areas⁶⁴). The maximum aim of the movement was certainly unification with Serbia, although most of the insurgents would probably have been satisfied with concessions on their minimum demands, that is, the abolition of urbarial obligations and the incorporation of the *županije* into a more autonomous Military Frontier⁶⁵).

The crucial ingredient, not only for the military success of the uprising but also for the fulfillment of its national program, was the official backing of Karadjordje's Serbia. Before the insurrection commenced, the Voganj circle persisted in using claims of aid from *Karadjordje* as the main way to generate public excitement, despite the uncertainty of that commitment⁶⁶). *Popović* and *Avramović-Vrbavac* apparently had the idea that once they had started the uprising and confronted *Karadjordje* with an accomplished fact, aid would be sure to come. Thus, in a letter to *Lazarević*, in which he informed him of the beginning of the uprising, *Popović* also demanded fifty to a hundred horsemen. There is no doubt that news of the uprising was received most enthusiastically in Serbia. *Lazarević's* units and particularly the Srijem refugees were more than willing to march across the Sava. But *Karadjordje's* caution prevailed over the wishes of his venturesome followers. He instructed *Lazarević* not to undertake any actions until *Popović's* claims could be verified⁶⁷). Accordingly, *Janko Nemeček*, a Slovak from Bačka Palanka who was one of the emigres attached to *Lazarević's* staff, was sent to Srijem in order to gather information on the progress of the rebellion⁶⁸). But even before *Nemeček* could reach Srijem, the uprising was defeated.

The insurgents were certainly demoralized by the fact that aid from Serbia failed to materialize. Their expectations of gaining support from the military frontiersmen and the cities also proved illusory. That is why the principal leaders of the uprising, *Avramović-Vrbavac* and his Voganj circle, sought to rely on the good offices of Metropolitan *Stratimirović*, and possibly to engage him in their movement. Their faith in *Stratimirović's* support was certainly motivated by the knowledge that the Metropolitan was favorably disposed to the aims of *Karadjordje's* revolution, with which they felt themselves fully associated in their uprising.

Stratimirović, however, was alarmed by the initial successes of the rebellion. He was farsighted enough to realize that this undertaking could only compromise the standing of *Karadjordje's* movement with Vienna. In addition, as person of authority, he could hardly be expected to side with the more radical elements in the uprising who endangered the interests not only of the secular estates but of the

⁶⁴) Ferdo Šišić, *Karadjordje, Južni Sloveni i Napoleonova Ilirija*, in: P. S. Petrović, ed., *Karadjordje: Život i delo*. Belgrade: Narodno delo, 1923, p. 51.

⁶⁵) Gavrilović, *Agrarni pokreti*, p. 44.

⁶⁶) *Ibidem*, p. 41.

⁶⁷) *Ibidem*, p. 40—41.

⁶⁸) Slavko Gavrilović, *Janko Nemeček (Teodor Plamečковиć), srbijanski uhoda u Sremu 1807*, *Zbornik Matice srpske: Serija društvenih nauka*, 1959, 23, pp. 88—89.

church as well. He could not have failed to notice that the serfs of the monastery estates (*prnjavorci*) were at the forefront of the insurgent ranks. Therefore, on April 8, at the invitation of the Voganj leaders, with great pomp he proceeded to the rebel camp near Vrdnik, with the aim of persuading the insurgents to abandon their course. It was then that *Tican*, „ein kleiner robuster Mann, von wildem Anblick“, as *Stratimirović* later described him, challenged the Metropolitan, confronted him with the visible signs of his separation from the people, and forced him to take refuge within the walls of the Vrdnik monastery, his road back to Karlovci blocked by *Tican*'s men⁶⁹).

Josif Putnik, the Archimandrite of the Grgeteg monastery and one of *Stratimirović*'s most astute advisers, in a report to his superior provided an extremely valuable clue which helps to explain the social basis of *Tican*'s militancy. The Archimandrite noted that "уже међу востаникама многи зликовци и бећари налазе се, којима ништа ни само лице свешеничкоје свето неје." (Among the insurrectionists there are many *bećari* and criminals, to whom nothing, not even priestly countenance, is sacred)⁷⁰). According to *Karadžić*'s dictionary, the term *bećar*, which ordinarily means a merry-maker or a rake (from Turkish *bekâr* = unwed youth), has a special meaning in Vojvodina, where it connotes day laborers without house or household — in other words, the poorest village stratum, landless peasants⁷¹). If we add to them the monastery serfs (*prnjavorci*), who had reason to resent the church, it is easy to see why *Putnik* considered these strata as particularly dangerous, violent, and not amenable to the exhortations of the hierarchy. Unlike the Voganj circle and the Metropolitanate of Karlovci, these people had small interest in the statehood goals of the movement. But even *Stratimirović*, though he looked with favor on *Karadjordje*'s revolution, could not as an allodial landlord be similarly affected by the peasant insurrections in Vojvodina. Moreover, *Stratimirović* believed that insurgent Serbia could not afford to risk losing favor with Vienna at the time when Habsburg benevolence was needed in order to bring the war against the Ottomans to a fortuitous end. He believed, quite rightly, that confrontation with both empires at the same time was impossible. Still, the church made every effort to alleviate the effects of state retribution in the aftermath of the uprising, thus reestablishing its custodial role in the Orthodox community. It sought to satisfy a multiplicity of contradictory interests, and on the whole succeeded in weathering the storm provoked by the Vojvodina stirrings.

Tican's attack on *Stratimirović* divided the insurgent ranks. The *bećari* and *prnjavorci* followed his lead, but the Voganj leaders could not agree with his arrogant behavior. Many of their followers were shocked by *Tican*'s treatment of the Metropolitan and began leaving the camp, while *Tican*'s supporters accused the Voganj group of betrayal. On April 10, after a good deal of pressure from his

⁶⁹) Sečanski, op. cit., pp. 36, 153. Cf. Gavrilović, Teodor Avramović-Tican, pp. 111—112.

⁷⁰) Sečanski, op. cit., p. 30.

⁷¹) Gavrilović, Seljački pokreti, p. 20.

opponents, who accepted *Stratimirović's* urgings to terminate the rebellion in exchange for the Metropolitan's protection, *Tican* finally abandoned his uncompromising course, and on April 11 made plans to flee Srijem, perhaps to Serbia. He failed in his aim and was arrested on the following day. *Stratimirović*, though he succeeded in effecting a general amnesty for all the other captured rebels, showed his disapproval of *Tican's* anti-church stand by conspicuously refusing to intervene on his behalf. Two years later, in 1809, *Tican* was executed in a particularly horrible fashion.

The collapse of *Tican's* rebellion was not the end of Vojvodina jacqueries. The unrest spread, in milder forms, to Bačka and also to parts of Virovitica and Požega counties in Slavonia, and lasted until 1815. Most of the outbreaks were devoid of clearly formulated national aspirations; many of them, though inspired generally by the "infectious example" of the Serbian revolution, encompassed Croat as well as Serb peasants. *Tican's* rebellion had an edifying effect on the Habsburg administration, which became determined to root out the last vestige of Serbian national propaganda. Censorship was given full play, and the "Stemmatografia" and other nationalist writings were seized as particularly seditious. Nevertheless, if these measures were designed to prevent further uprisings in Vojvodina, it cannot be said that they were completely successful.

The last major uprising in Vojvodina took place on June 12—13, 1808, this time in Kruščica, a Military Frontier village near Bela Crkva in the southern Banat⁷²). Like *Tican's* rebellion, the Kruščica uprising traditionally has been attributed to the direct influence of not only the Serbian revolution, but, in the writings of some historians, of *Karadjordje* himself. The uprising, which had the aim of wresting most of the Banat from Habsburg rule, was started by *Dimitrije Djordjević* (*Georgijević*), the local assistant parish priest, with the assistance of several Serb officers in the Habsburg army. One of these officers, *Marjan Jovanović*, a retired captain, had close ties with Serbian leaders, particularly with *Milenko Stojković*, who was undoubtedly involved in the planning of the rebellion and whose extreme pro-Russian attitude probably contributed to the Kruščica rebels' ill-founded expectations of Russian aid. The uprising was quickly terminated after the vigorous intervention of church hierarchy. Emissaries sent by *Petar Jovanović-Vidak*, the bishop of Vršac, succeeded in quieting the villagers, and the bishop persuaded the leaders to surrender voluntarily to the Habsburg army. *Jovanović-Vidak's* part in curbing the rebellion was notable for its extreme servility in face of the authorities, and it stands in marked contrast to *Stratimirović's* pointed spurning of

⁷²) Most of the primary sources on the Kruščica rebellion, particularly the letters exchanged between *Stratimirović* and *Jovanović-Vidak*, can be found in Slavko Gavrilović, ed., *Dokumenta Karlovačkog arhiva o Kruščičkoj buni 1808 godine*, *Zbornik Matice srpske: Serija društvenih nauka* 1955, 12, pp. 76—87. See also Petar Momirović, *Zapisi o Kruščici i buni 1808 g.*, *ibidem*, pp. 87—89; Dositej Djorić, *Arhimandrit mesički Sinesije Radivojević i Kruščička buna*, *Glasnik Istoriskog društva u Novom Sadu* (1934), no. 7, 1—3, pp. 362—363; Slavko Gavrilović, *Dva priloga proučavanju Kruščičke bune 1808*, *Zbornik Matice srpske: Serija društvenih nauka*, 1954, 7, pp. 187—195.

any attempt to place the blame for the Kruščica movement on Serbia, or on *Karadjordje* himself. Both prelates, however, sternly condemned this “God-hateful” insurrection, although, as in the case of *Tican*’s rebellion, the hierarchy was reluctant to aid the authorities in the prosecution of the rebels.

Recent historical literature has confirmed the authenticity of *Karadjordje*’s 1809 declaration to Baron *Simbschen*, in which the Serbian leader denied any responsibility for *Tican*’s and Kruščica rebellions⁷³). It must be remembered, however, that *Karadjordje* and the *Sovjet* pursued different policies in regard to insurrections in the Ottoman Empire and in the Habsburg Monarchy. Insurgent Serbia provoked, aided, and encouraged rebellions in Bosnia, southern Serbia, and the other lands under Ottoman rule. This was strategically necessary, since it weakened the principal adversary of the revolution. But Serbian leadership was careful to avoid any direct involvement with the uprisings in the Habsburg lands, knowing full well that such a course would inevitably lead to a confrontation with Vienna, which Serbia could ill afford, and knowing also that Serbia was dependent primarily on the Monarchy for arms and food. On the other hand, individual *vojvode* often acted independently of *Karadjordje* and the *Sovjet*. Some, like *Milenko Stojković*, were involved in oppositional activities against *Karadjordje* and counted on Russian backing in case of confrontation with Vienna. Their occasional extravagant claims were often seized upon by the Vojvodina émigrés in Serbia, who desperately wanted to provoke rebellions in the Habsburg lands. Nevertheless, despite the generally circumspect attitude which the central Serbian leadership displayed in regard to the uprisings in Vojvodina, it would be incorrect to assume that these rebellions were viewed with hostility among the Serbian chiefs. In fact, they were admired from a necessary distance, while the gates of Serbia remained wide open to all the fleeing rebels in search of a refuge.

After the defeat of the First Uprising in 1813, and as a result of a temporary renewal of Ottoman rule in Serbia, 100,000 Serbs, headed by *Karadjordje* and most of his *vojvode*, migrated to Vojvodina⁷⁴). Vienna facilitated their flight, al-

⁷³) Gavrilović, *Dva priloga*, pp. 192—194.

⁷⁴) On the flight of Serbian refugees to Vojvodina, especially in 1813, see: Gavrilović, *Vojvodina i Srbija*, pp. 305—406; Aleksa Ivić, *Izbeglice iz Srbije an austriskom zemljištu 1813 i 1814*, *Istoriski časopis*, Belgrade, 2, 1949—1950, pp. 157—163; Robert Paulović, *Sudbina srpskih izbeglica posle Prvog srpskog ustanka prema aktima Slavonsko-sremske generalne komande u Petrovaradinu*, *Zbornik Matice srpske: Serija društvenih nauka*, 7, 1954, pp. 126—146; Mihailo Gavrilović, *Srpska emigracija i Bečki kongres, 1814—1815*, *Srpski književni glasnik*, January 1, 1906, pp. 116—125; Lazar Čelap, *Emigriranje beogradskih stanovnika u Zemun posle ponovnih prelazaka Beograda pod tursku vlast u XVIII i XIX stoleću*, *Godišnjak Muzeja grada Beograda*, Belgrade, 4, 1957, pp. 107—110; Tih[omir] O[stojić], *Pomoć novosadske opštine beguncima iz Srbije 1813. godine*, *Brankovo kolo*, Srem. Karlovci, 16, 1910, pp. 507—508; Kosta Petrović, *O boravku Karadjordjeve porodice i drugih emigranata iz Srbije u Sremskim Karlovcima 1813 i 1814 god.*, *Zbornik Matice srpske: Serija društvenih nauka*, 1955, 11, pp. 55—61.

though the local representatives of the Monarchy no doubt frequently worsened the condition of the dispirited refugees. But although *Karadjordje* and many other Serbian leaders found themselves in internment, the Monarchy never seriously contemplated Ottoman demands for their extradition, which would surely have led to execution.

For their part, the Serbs of Vojvodina greatly aided the fleeing insurgents and thus once again underscored the ties between the Serbs on both banks of the Sava and the Danube. The solicitude for *Karadjordje* was understandable enough. In his flight the Serbs of Vojvodina saw a repetition of their own past. As in the days of the despots and the Third and Fourth *Arsenije*, a *vojvoda* was leading new generations of *Vojvodjani* (lit. = those led by a *vojvoda*) to safety. In *Karadjordje* and the subsequent rulers of restored Serbia, the Serbs of Vojvodina saw the focal point of their own aspirations. Did not *Karadjordje*'s title of *Vožd* (Leader) express the recognition that renewed Serbia would take the lead in the unification of the Serbs? For,

ИЗ' ТЕБЕ БО ИЗЫДЕТЪ ВОЖДЬ
from thee shall come forth a leader...⁷⁵⁾

⁷⁵⁾ Matthew 2:6.